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Abstract 
This article explores the institutional causes of karoshi (death from 
overwork) and karojisatsu (suicide induced by overwork and 
work-related depression) in Japan. Rejecting the culturalist 
explanations of these health problems, this study discusses the 
management-labor struggles of postwar Japan and their impacts 
on the institutional modes of labor relations. It specifically 
examines the institutional features of internal labor markets that 
are closely linked to karoshi and karojisatsu by exploring how the 
Japanese employees are driven to overwork at the micro level. 
Drawing on the Foucauldian idea of governmentality and utilizing 
a sociological approach, this research treats these institutional 
forms of labor relations as part of the governmental technology 
that has adversely affected the everyday working lives of 
employees and has compelled them to overwork.  
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Governing Employees: A Foucauldian Analysis of  
Deaths from Overwork in Japan１ 
 
 
Yoshio Shibata 
 
1. Introduction: The Reality of Karoshi and Karojisatsu 
The relentless job demands on employees in Japan is most strikingly 
illuminated by the so-called karoshi (death from overwork) and 
karojisatsu (suicide induced by overwork and work-related 
depression) syndromes. Sudden deaths from stroke and heart 
disease caused by overwork were first recognized in the late 1970s. 
The term karoshi was coined by a group of labor lawyers in 1988 
when they established the National Defense Counsel for Victims of 
Karoshi and started the “Karoshi Hotline” to provide consulting 
services and to draw attention to the problem. They received some 
2,500 calls in the first three years, including calls from victims’ 
relatives, and helped them to file claims for compensation with the 
Labor Standards Inspection Offices.２ Karoshi was even listed in 
some English dictionaries (Morioka, 2005: 26-27). Since then, karoshi 
has been officially recognized as a workplace injury eligible for 
compensation. The victims’ families sometimes sued the 
corporations and the Labor Standards Inspection Offices when their 
compensation claims were rejected. Since the late 1990s, labor 
lawyers and activists have drawn attention to karojisatsu syndrome, 
which was also officially recognized as a workplace injury 
(Kawahito, 1998). The spread of job-related depression, whether or 
not ending in suicide, has become a serious problem not only for 
Japanese workers but also for the corporations.３ 
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It is difficult to determine precisely the scale of karoshi and 
karojisatsu. Since 2003, the number of formal karoshi claims has 
exceeded 300 each year and only 50% of the claims resulted in some 
form of compensation. The number of claims for work-related 
mental illness skyrocketed from 13 in 1995 to 927 in 2008, and the 
rate of official recognition was around 15% in the past decade. The 
number of karojisatsu claims increased from 10 in 1995 to 164 in 
2007 (Kumazawa, 2010: 19). However, these figures are no more 
than the tip of the iceberg because most victims and survivors never 
filed any claims (ibid.). The National Defense Counsel for Victims of 
Karoshi estimates as many as 10,000 Japanese workers to have died 
from karoshi annually.４ 
Although many labor lawyers and activists have expressed 
concern over the fast-growing cases of karoshi and karojisatsu since 
the late 1980s, the institutional arrangements blamed by the lawyers 
and activists for causing the problems remain unchanged. ５ 
According to many labor scholars, the problems have only 
worsened (Kumazawa, 2010; Morioka, 2004, 2005; Nakano, 2006; 
Ogoshi, 2006). In 2006, a national magazine even called Japan 
Karōshi Taikoku (Karoshi Empire).６ The Ministry of Health, Labor 
and Welfare has set 80 hours of overtime per month as the “karoshi 
line.” Causal relationships between overwork and illness can be 
identified when the amount of overtime exceeds 80 hours for at least 
two consecutive months. According to the official statistics, the 
number of employees working beyond the karoshi line increased 
from 4.8 million in 2002 (i.e., 11.9% of the employees working 200 
days or more annually) to 5.4 million in 2007 (i.e., 12.7% of the 
employees working 200 days or above) (Ministry of Internal Affairs 
and Communications, 2008: 19).  
Karoshi and karojisatsu are found among workers in all jobs 
and all age groups (Kumazawa, 2010).７  A tendency specific to 
Japan is that much of overtime work is unpaid. The scope of unpaid 
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overtime, commonly known as sābisu zangyō (service overtime), is 
not easy to grasp because it never appears in the government 
statistics.８  However, Morioka Koji (2009), a leading expert on 
Japan’s work hours, estimates the average “service overtime” per 
each full-time employee in 2006 to be as high as 247 hours a year. By 
eliminating this astonishing amount of service overtime, it is 
estimated to be able to create more than four million new jobs.  
How has this situation come about? Karoshi and karojisatsu 
cases are not exceptional in Japan but they appear to be exceptional 
in international comparison (Kumazawa, 2010). Such a Japanese 
“national specificity” attracts some culturalist explanations. This 
study, however, argues that the causes of deaths from overwork are 
deeply embedded in the entire institutional arrangements of labor 
relations in postwar Japan. Both karoshi and karojisatsu cases reflect 
more serious structural problems of domestic labor relations. The 
seemingly separate problems such as the job insecurity faced by 
contingent workers, the lack of collective bargaining power, and the 
expansion of neoliberal economic reforms are indirectly but 
profoundly related to the problem of karoshi. Therefore, we can 
challenge those ahistorical culturalist explanations by examining the 
institutional idiosyncrasies of Japanese labor relations, in particular, 
the historical process in which the current institutional 
arrangements took shape.  
The following analysis draws on a Foucauldian perspective 
to conceptualize these institutional forms as a technology of power 
that indirectly affects the everyday working lives of Japanese 
employees. This investigation is not simply an attempt to clarify the 
direct and observable causes of deaths from overwork. Instead, it 
seeks to shed light on some general institutional problems of labor 
relations in Japan, the history of management-labor struggles, and 
the ways in which Japanese employees are exploited and governed 
institutionally.  
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2. Labor Relations in Postwar Japan: From Struggle to 
Compromise to Institutionalization９ 
Four interrelated institutional characteristics of labor relations in 
contemporary Japan are closely linked to karoshi and karojisatsu 
instances: (1) the discriminatory treatment of non-regular workers; 
(2) the person-based pay system with ambiguous merit evaluation; 
(3) the dysfunction of the general labor market in providing the 
life-chances to working people; and (4) the ultra-cooperative 
enterprise-based labor unions. These institutional arrangements 
have arisen from the complex history of management-labor 
struggles of postwar Japan. Once placed in this historical context, it 
is possible to understand the rise of labor unions’ moderate 
demands in the early postwar period, the Japanese managers’ 
reactions towards and their compromises with the labor sectors, and 
the subsequent institutionalization of labor relations (Figure 1). 
 
a. Workers’ Demands in the Early Postwar Years 
Although the extremely cooperative enterprise-based labor unions 
have characterized Japan’s labor relations, the labor movements of 
the early postwar years were much more contentious and 
confrontational. Shortly after the end of the Second World War, 
labor unions proliferated; in March 1946 alone, about 3,300 unions 
were formed and nationwide union membership approached five 
million at the end of the year (Gordon, 1985; Nimura, 1984). Some 
unions took control of factories and resumed production that had 
been halted since the end of the War. Factories were managed 
through a direct and participatory workplace democracy (Nimura, 
2001; Otake, 1994; Yamamoto, 1983). While most union members 
were based in specific workplaces, they actively participated in the 
industry-wide federations of unions and coordinated their demands 
at the societal level (Takagi, 1982).  
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Managers’ reactions 
Compromises and 
institutional results Workers’ demands 
Abolishing 
Discriminatory 
Treatment of 
Blue-collar 
workers 
Participatory 
workplace 
democracy 
Job security for 
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- Wage determined by 
age and family size 
Industry-wide 
federation of 
unions 
Acceptance 
of individual 
evaluation 
Giving up equal pay for 
equal job principle 
Managers’ freedom on 
the issue of job 
transfer 
Temporary workers are 
exclude from unions 
and discriminated 
Discrimination of 
female employees 
Person-based pay system 
= Long-term individual 
evaluation with ambiguous 
criteria    
Ultra-cooperative 
enterprise-based unions 
Excluding radical 
workers by ambiguous 
evaluation 
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Internal 
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flexibility 
Workplace Control  
- Dividing workers 
- Inciting individual 
competition 
External 
labor 
flexibility 
Discriminatory 
treatment of 
non-regular 
employees 
Power mechanisms that cause karoshi 
Weakening 
industry-wide 
federation of 
unions 
State’s repression of 
industrial democracy 
Workers’ failure to establish 
working class public sphere 
Postwar Period 
Prewar and Wartime Periods 
State’s wartime 
labor policy 
 Figure 1: The History of Management-Labor Struggles in Japan  
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This labor activism is essential for understanding the 
socioeconomic orientation of blue-collar workers because they 
spearheaded the early postwar labor movements and greatly 
influenced the subsequent institutional arrangements of labor 
relations. These postwar unions had three specific demands: (1) the 
abolition of the discriminatory treatment of blue-collar workers; (2) 
the pursuit of a “livelihood wage”; and (3) the protection of job 
security. The concern about the discriminatory treatment should be 
understood against the backdrop of harsh prewar discrimination 
against industrial workers. Blue-collar workers were pejoratively 
called shokkō (manual laborers or factory hands) and discriminated 
against not only in wages and promotion but also in a whole range 
of working conditions (e.g. being housed in the poor company 
dormitories under strict supervision and eating poor-quality food at 
company dining rooms). They were treated as second-class 
members of the enterprises and belonged to the category of “lower 
society” (Gordon, 1985; Kumazawa, 1996; Nimura, 1984, 1987).  
The pursuit of a “livelihood wage” was to seek a new wage 
system that would approximate the life-cycle needs of workers such 
as expenses for marriage, raising and educating children, and 
retirement benefits. In concrete terms, it demanded the guarantee of 
automatic wage increases based on workers’ age and family size. 
Such benefits were only provided to white-collar workers in the 
prewar period. Thus, the pursuit of a livelihood wage was closely 
related to the unions’ demand for fair and equal treatment of 
blue-collar workers. A few words should be said about the 
livelihood wage system.  
First, the system expected male employees to earn 
breadwinner wages. While wages under this system were 
unambiguously determined by one’s age and family size regardless 
of gender, female employees were expected to quit working upon 
marriage; the unions generally accepted such gender discrimination 
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in the workplace (Nimura, 1994). Both managers and unions shared 
the assumption that the proper place for married women was the 
household. Second, the wage system was incompatible with the 
principle of “equal pay for equal work,” which presupposed a 
job-based wage system. A livelihood wage was determined by 
workers’ age and family size, not by the job nature.１０ Third, while 
the unions insisted on the guarantee of a “livelihood” portion of the 
wage, they accepted and even requested the “ability-pay” 
component of the wage to be determined by the evaluation of 
workers’ performance (Nimura, 1994; Nomura, 1994). This reflected 
the anti-discrimination demand of the prewar period because many 
blue-collar workers resented the old management practices that had 
relegated industrial workers to lower wages and status regardless of 
their ability (Nimura, 1994). At least for some workers, the “abolition 
of discrimination” meant that the management would give white- 
and blue-collar workers the same opportunity of career 
advancement and recognize their resulting wage differences 
(Nimura, 1994; Nomura, 2003).  
We can see some ambivalence in these wage demands: they 
were both egalitarian and competition-minded.１１ Moreover, the 
managers’ right to evaluate employees was taken for granted. The 
unions neither requested the managers to publicize the evaluation 
process nor constructed a set of acceptable criteria for assessment. 
The unions also failed to push the managers to inform each 
employee of the evaluation outcomes and to allow the unions and 
their members to challenge the outcomes (Endo, 1999; Nomura, 
1994). 
The pursuit of job security was the most contentious. The 
postwar labor unions engaged in numerous prolonged disputes 
with the managers under the slogan of “totally against dismissal,” 
but they did not attempt to establish an orderly procedure for 
layoffs of employees as the labor unions had done in the U.S. For 
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Japanese workers, job security is “all or nothing” (Gordon, 1985; 
Nomura, 1994). The unions’ pursuit of job security has always been 
closely connected with the demand for a “livelihood wage.” Under 
this livelihood wage system, the Japanese corporations prefer hiring 
young and single workers whose wages are lower than older and 
experienced ones, unless the unions intervene into the hiring 
practices and challenge any age discrimination (which they seldom 
do). Once a middle-aged worker with a family to support loses his 
job, finding a new job at a comparable wage is very difficult. The 
age and family size components of this wage system certainly have 
ensured the livelihoods of those workers who are already in the 
internal labor market, but this system fails to maintain the 
livelihoods of those workers who move from one company to 
another. In other words, the livelihood wage system has presupposed 
the job security of workers. 
The rationale used by the unions to justify these demands can 
be traced to the prewar and wartime eras. Harsh discrimination 
against industrial workers in prewar Japan was first effectively 
contested not by labor organizations, which were violently 
suppressed by the state, but by the wartime government itself. The 
military state needed to increase its industrial outputs in times of 
total war but to do that, reducing the high turnover of industrial 
workers and establishing a “harmonious relationship” between 
management and labor were crucial. Hence, the state intervened in 
the labor relations by providing blue-collar employees with a 
seniority-based livelihood wage and calling for better treatment of 
workers (Kurokawa, 1964).  
The ideological reason for doing so during wartime had 
nothing to do with the principle of fair exchange between labor and 
compensation (i.e., equal pay for equal job). This concept of fair 
exchange was firmly rejected by the state as a selfish mode of 
transaction, symbolizing individualism, liberalism and other 
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“Western cultural traits” and endangering the “collectivist” cultural 
traits and national identity of Japan (Fujino, 2000). Instead, the 
widespread ideology of Kōkoku kinrōkan (The Imperial Work Ethic) 
advocated that as long as the laborers worked diligently to serve the 
nation, they deserved respect and treatment as equal members of an 
“enterprise family” and of the Japanese Empire (Kurokawa, 1964; 
Saguchi, 1991). 
In reality, workers of prewar Japan lacked an autonomous, 
alternative means to raise their status other than living at the mercy 
of the militarist state. They did not have the time and resources to 
develop what Geoff Eley (1990) calls a “working class public 
sphere”―a domain of social communication among workers that are 
supported by working class communities.１２ As a result, Japanese 
workers could not fully develop their class identity, distinctive 
values, philosophy, culture, and supporting organizations and 
networks. Nor could they overcome the state’s suppression of 
industrial democracy. The state never recognized workers’ rights to 
organize themselves and bargain collectively (Saguchi, 1991). 
Without a sense of working class solidarity and an institutional 
framework of industrial democracy, workers had to rely on the 
“egalitarian” drive of nationalist ideology and the wartime 
government’s labor policies (Kurita, 1994; Saguchi, 1991).１３ 
While the wartime state failed to boost productivity mainly 
because of the managers’ reluctance to treat their workers better, the 
prewar ideology and labor policies continued to shape the rationale 
of workers’ demands during the early postwar era. Abolishing 
discrimination and implementing a livelihood wage were what the 
wartime state promised, and the postwar unions continued to fight 
for these aims. Paradoxically, popular attitude towards the gender 
division of labor at home and the rejection of the principle of equal 
pay for equal work were also embedded in the union’ demands. The 
unions justified these claims under the old wartime slogan of 
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“equality as jyūgyōin (employees)” (Kumazawa, 1996) or what 
Andrew Gordon (1985) calls “full membership rights” within the 
same enterprise. The term jyūgyōin could simply be translated as 
“employee(s)” but implies a certain sense of “membership” in a 
collective body. Their primary identity was the “membership” of the 
workplace and enterprise, not the role of “workers” in society at 
large (Miyake, 1991). The jyūgyōin unions often claimed to lead the 
reconstruction of national industries and called for the better 
treatment and career advancement of workers, a claim similar to the 
wartime state’s labor mobilization (Saguchi, 1991). This strategy of 
claiming equality resolved around the idea of a collective identity―a 
claim for belonging to a collectivity within which this labor 
“equality” was to be ensured. 
 
b. Managers’ Reaction and Emerging Compromises 
While the early postwar labor movements were ambivalent about 
their political orientation, they did exercise workplace democracy 
and establish industry-wide affiliations. Because of the fear of labor 
activism, Japanese managers sought to regain control of the 
workplace and to contain trade union activities within an enterprise 
by weakening any industry-wide workers’ federations. As a result, 
the extremely cooperative enterprise-based unions, for which 
Japanese labor relations are famous, emerged.１４ 
Weakening the leftist federations of unions was an objective 
shared by the managers, the Japanese government, and the U.S. 
Occupational Authority throughout the Cold War. In 1950, the 
Japanese government, with the approval of the U.S. Occupational 
Authority, purged Communist Party officials from public office. The 
“Red Purge” spread throughout the public and private sectors, 
dismissing over 12,000 workers deemed to be Communists or 
Communist sympathizers (Gordon, 1985: 333). The unified 
management class also prohibited the intra-enterprise unions from 
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delegating the rights of collective bargaining to any third party (i.e., 
an industry-wide federation) and acknowledged only the 
intra-enterprise unions as the legitimate collective bargaining party 
(Miyake, 1995).  
At the enterprise and workplace levels, the tactics to which 
the management had resorted since the early 1950s nurtured, often 
secretly, informal loyalist groups to penetrate the unions, to spread 
the idea of “cooperation between management and workers,” to 
take control of the existing unions, and to launch the cooperative 
second unions (Gordon, 1998; Saito, 1990).１５  In this process of 
co-optation, the managers greatly utilized the ambiguous merit 
evaluations to marginalize the workers. According to Andrew 
Gordon (1998), “the labor division made sure that merit evaluations 
favored the informal group members, who could argue with 
conviction to workmates that supporting the group was a wise 
career move” (81). Struggles continued throughout the 1950s, but by 
the 1960s, the management had not only re-established workplace 
control but also confined union activities, now more amenable to the 
managers, within the boundary of each enterprise. 
While the unions gradually lost their sense of activism, the 
managers and union activists managed to reach some compromises. 
In order to protect the workers’ job security, many unions accepted 
the practice of hiring temporary employees and subcontractors 
during the 1950s and 1960s (Gordon, 1985: 390, 400). This marked 
the beginning of the two employment categories in Japan’s labor 
market: seiki jyūgyōin (regular employees) and hi-seiki jyūgyōin 
(non-regular employees). Since then, the non-regular employees 
have become a “buffer” to protect the employment of regular 
employees in times of economic downturn. This is one of the 
clearest signs that the early postwar confrontational unions either 
had been replaced by the “cooperative” second unions or had been 
transformed into “cooperative” ones since the former would not 
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allow managers to hire temporaries (Gordon, 1985: 404). There were 
other compromises in exchange for the regular employees’ job 
security. Since the 1950s, the unions tried to protect the employment 
statuses of regular workers within a corporation, and the managers in 
large corporations began to entertain their demands provided that 
the unions had accepted the reassignment of the employees in a 
fast-changing job structure (Gordon, 1985: 390-393).  
As a result, it has become an unwritten agreement that the 
managers should do their best to retain the regular workers, but 
they enjoyed almost unrestrained discretion over job transfer and 
personnel issues (Kumazawa, 1996: 147). In exchange for the job 
security, the unions also accepted overtime work. A certain amount 
of overtime came to be seen as necessary so that the amount of 
overtime, not the number of workers, could be reduced during the 
economic downturns. This has legalized the practice that workers 
need to put in overtime in order to gain the job security they seek 
(Hamaguchi, 2009). 
As for the wage issue, the managers tried to place efficiency at 
the center of wage calculation, which contradicted the unions’ 
insistence on nearly automatic and across-the-board wage increases. 
As a compromise, the workers’ wages, at least those paid by the 
large corporations, came to be determined by a combination of 
individual “ability” based on the managers’ assessment and one’s 
seniority, which replaced age in the livelihood wage (Gordon, 1985). 
The nature of ability pay was likewise transformed. In pushing for 
efficiency-based pay, the managers attempted to impose short-term 
incentives and output pay in the late 1940s and early 1950s. But 
faced with the unions’ resistance and technological changes that had 
made rate setting in production more difficult, the managers found 
the indirect incentive of the long-term, periodic evaluation of each 
worker to determine salary raise and promotion a superior way of 
motivating the workers (Gordon, 1985: 382). This system was widely 
 
Governing Employees 
13 
adopted by most of the large enterprises throughout the late 1960s 
and the 1970s, and the “ability” factor in determining wage increase 
and promotion has grown in influence ever since (Kumazawa, 1996; 
1997). 
 
c. The Institutional Characteristics of the Postwar 
Labor Relations 
Blue-collar workers in early postwar Japan fought fiercely to become 
full members of the enterprises and they have largely achieved this 
goal.１６ Male regular employees, both white- and blue-collar, and 
their families are often seen as belonging to the “salaryman” 
stratum, the large middle stratum in Japan (Kumazawa, 1997: 32; 
Morioka, 2009a: 142). While the enterprise-based unions became 
more amenable to the managers, they left the female and 
non-regular employees behind and treated them as the secondary 
members. These unions also accepted harsh working conditions that 
drove regular employees to overwork. The following institutional 
forms of labor relations directly resulted from the compromise 
between management and labor, and the causes of overwork were 
embedded in them.  
 
i. The Discriminatory Treatment of Female and 
Non-regular Workers 
The discriminatory treatment of non-regular employees (i.e., 
part-timers, temporary workers with a fixed contract, 
agency-dispatched workers) and the rapid growth of the working 
poor population have worsened in Japan over the past decade. Since 
most victims of karoshi and karojisatsu are male regular employees, 
the problem of karoshi and that of non-regular workers appear to be 
separate. However, the situations of these two categories of 
employees are mutually constitutive; it is necessary to understand 
how the discriminatory treatment of non-regular employees leads to 
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karoshi-inducing overwork among regular employees. 
 Since the livelihood wage system presupposed gender 
division of labor at home and the female regular employees were 
expected to quit upon marriage, women have not been placed in 
important positions and their wages have been lower than the male 
counterparts (ibid.).１７ The gender discrimination prevailed in the 
1970s when the number of housewife part-timers grew rapidly. 
Since most of these women were financially dependent on their 
husbands, it was thought that they only needed “supplementary 
income for their families” (Kimoto, 1995, 1995a; Ogoshi, 2006; 
Osawa, 1993). Such reasoning could only be justified because the 
equal pay for equal work principle was never enforced in the 
Japanese labor market. The flip side of the gender discrimination is 
that the male regular employees are expected to devote the whole 
life to their jobs, not only because they receive a breadwinner salary 
but also because they are supposed to be completely free from the 
housework, leaving all the burdens to their wives (Kimoto, 1995, 
1995a; Osawa, 1993). Thus, both the low wage of non-regular 
employees and the expectation of hard work on regular employees 
have been institutionalized along the gender line (Nakano, 2006).  
The employment safety-net system in Japan reveals the same 
gender bias as it is modeled on a family composed of the main 
breadwinner as a regular employee (i.e., the husband) and the 
spouse (i.e., the wife) as a non-regular employee for supplementary 
income. Since non-regular female workers are thought to depend on 
their husbands’ income, unemployment allowance is designed only 
for regular employees (Nomura, 1998; Osawa, 1993).１８ For this 
reason, non-regular employees have difficulty applying for social 
insurance and unemployment allowance (Hamaguchi, 2009; Nakano, 
2006; Yuasa, 2008). Once the low wage and the lack of the safety-net 
support of non-regular employees are established along the gender 
line, both male and female non-regular employees have become 
 
Governing Employees 
15 
disadvantaged. At the same time, the female employees are 
discriminated against within each employment categories as well. 
The two types of discrimination clearly appear in the wage levels of 
each group. Combining these regular/non-regular and male/female 
comparisons, each group’s average hourly wage level in 2008 is 
shown in Table 1.１９  
 
Table 1: Average Hourly Wage Level of Each Employment 
Categories in 2008 
  
Regular 
employees 
Non-regular employees 
Fulltime Part-time 
Male 2,608（100%） 1,471（56%） 1,071（41%） 
Female 1,847（71%） 1,128（43%） 975（37%） 
Currency Unit: Japanese Yen (Male regular employee=100%) 
 
 
The extent of wage gaps in terms of gender difference and 
employment categories in Japan are unusual among the OECD 
(Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development) 
countries.  
The number of non-regular employees has increased 
considerably as shown in Table 2. In the past two decades, the figure 
has more than doubled and now one out of three Japanese workers 
is non-regular employee. More than half of female workers hold 
non-regular positions. In contrast to the female workers, most male 
workers still hold regular positions. One research finding shows, 
however, that among young male workers (15 to 34 years old), 
23.1% were non-regular employees in 2007, a rapid increase from 
10.5% in 1992 (Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, 
2008: 34). This has led to the rapid growth of the working poor 
population that is made up of households without a single regular 
employee among the family members (Nakano, 2006; Yuasa, 
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2008).２０ Yet most of them cannot even apply for unemployment 
allowance. The irony is that those less fortune who need the 
protection of social safety-net and employment provisions most 
have the least public support. 
 
Table 2: The Number of Regular and Non-regular Employees and 
the Proportion of Non-Regular Employees２１ 
  
Number of employees 
(10,000 employees) 
Proportion of non- 
regular employees (%) 
Year  
(quarterly) 
Employees 
in total  
Regular 
employees 
Non-regular 
employees 
Both 
sexes 
Male Female 
1990 (Feb) 4,369 3,488 881 20.2 8.8 38.1 
1995 (Feb) 4,780 3,779 1,001 20.9 8.9 39.1 
1997 (Feb) 4,963 3,812 1,152 23.2 10.5 41.7 
2000 (Feb) 4,903 3,630 1,273 26.0 11.7 46.4 
2005 (Annual 
average) 
5,007 3,374 1,633 32.6 17.7 52.5 
2010 (Jan-Mar 
average) 
5,071 3,363 1,708 33.7 18.3 53.3 
 
 
Non-regular workers have long served as a “buffer” to 
protect the job security of regular employees (Nomura, 1998; Ogoshi, 
2006). The rapid growth of non-regular employees in the past two 
decades, however, represents a gradual replacement of regular workers 
by non-regular ones, going far beyond the level of a buffer.２２ More 
core tasks once handled by regular employees are now performed 
by non-regular workers. As part of the employers’ strategy to 
reduce labor cost,２３  this trend of development has been made 
possible by the neoliberal labor policies of the Japanese government 
since the late 1990s such as the deregulation of the Labor Law 
(Nakano, 2006: 68; Ogoshi, 2006: 182). The corporations are now 
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filling permanent positions with low-paid and easily dismissible 
non-regular workers by renewing their short-term contracts over 
and over again (Honda, 2009; Nakano, 2006; Ogoshi, 2006). Japan is 
one of the very few OECD member states where such an 
exploitative employment practice is allowed publicly (Hamaguchi, 
2009). The difficult condition of non-regular workers is one of the 
causes of the karoshi and karojisatsu syndromes among regular 
employees as shown below.  
 
ii. Person-based Pay System with Ambiguous Merit 
Evaluation 
The labor unions’ utter failure to push the equal pay for equal job 
principle and their acceptance of the long-term merit evaluation 
have given rise to a person-based pay system in which the wage is 
attached to the person, not to the job. This person-based wage 
system has a strong institutional consistency with the discretionary 
power of management over job transfer. While constant job transfers 
lead to unstable wages for workers under a job-based wage system, 
the person-based wage system makes workers accept job transfers, 
willingly or not (Nomura, 1994; 1998).  
The person-based wage system has given the managers great 
advantages: it has saved tremendous amounts of time for constant 
job analyses that would be necessary under the job-wage system; as 
a result, the rationalization of production that constantly creates 
new jobs can proceed smoothly and the tasks that one employee has 
to perform can be left ambiguous (Nomura, 1998). Furthermore, the 
acceptance of this wage system among regular employees and the 
availability of non-regular employees have made possible a 
“post-Fordist” labor flexibility; a combination of internal (or 
functional) labor flexibility (i.e., flexible deployment of labor within 
the internal labor market) and external (or numerical) labor 
flexibility (i.e., procurement of contingent workers from the external 
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labor market) (Harvey, 1990; Kumazawa, 1995b). The “Just-in-time” 
(JIT) production system or the “lean production” system has been 
built on these advantages of internal labor flexibility (Coriat, 1992; 
Delbridge, Turnbull and Wilkinson, 1992; Nomura, 1993; Ōno, 1978).  
By making each worker familiar with multiple tasks and by 
organizing workers into flexible work teams, the production system 
can be constantly adjusted not only in response to fluctuating 
market demands but also to reduce the number of workers for the 
purpose of “waste elimination” (ibid.). The system leaves no single 
worker idle. Personnel reduction made possible by internal labor 
flexibility intensifies the production process and prolongs the 
working time of each employee. This contributes to the karoshi and 
karojisatsu syndromes.  
As the managers enjoy these economic and strategic 
advantages over the workers, they have institutionalized the 
person-based wage system as Shokunō Shikaku Seido (Skill-based 
Grading System) throughout Japan since the 1970s and 1980s. All 
regular employees are classified into the broadly defined “skill” and 
“ability” grades.２４ The system grades workers, not their jobs, by 
seniority and “ability,” and the wage level is largely determined by 
one’s grade, regardless of the nature of the assigned job. Largely due 
to the lack of job analysis and the absence of a job-based wage 
system, the criteria for evaluating each employee’s “ability” are very 
ambiguous and subjective (Endo 1999; Kumazawa, 1993, 1996, 1997, 
1998, 2010).２５ 
Since the middle of the 1990s, more Japanese corporations 
have implemented a result-oriented (seika shugi) wage and 
evaluation system as part of the neoliberal economic reforms. 
Although the new evaluation system claims to be more fair and 
objective, no efforts have been made to establish any objective 
evaluation criteria (Hamaguchi, 2009; Kumazawa, 1997, 2010; 
Ogoshi, 2006; Saito and Tokyo Manager’s Union, 2005). On the 
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contrary, the new wage system has enlarged the loosely defined 
“ability” and the ambiguous “result” portion, and has much 
reduced the seniority portion, which is a person-based yet clear and 
objective factor. Thus, the overall wage determination mechanism 
has become more ambiguous than before (ibid.). Since then, the 
average salary of regular employees has declined, the peer 
competition has been intensified, and the salary gap among regular 
employees has widened (Hashimoto, 2009; Kumazawa, 2010; 
Morioka, 2009; Nakano, 2006; Ogoshi, 2006).  
While the regular workers’ employment is securer than that 
of non-regular workers, their job security is becoming shakier as 
more regular employees can be easily replaced by non-regular ones. 
Even though the regular workers enjoy certain degree of legal 
protection, the Japanese corporations have dismissed a large 
number of middle-aged regular employees through various forms of 
restructuring since the mid-1990s (Ogoshi, 2006; Saito and Tokyo 
Manager’s Union, 2005). In this hostile working environment, most 
regular employees are worried about the negative evaluation of 
their performance and the possibility of dismissal.  
 
iii. The Dysfunction of the General Labor Market in 
Providing Life Chances to Working people 
Given the exploitative nature of the person-based pay system (i.e., 
the lack of equal pay for equal job principle), the fragmentation of 
labor unions into enterprise units and the lack of standardization of 
working conditions at the industry-wide level, there is virtually no 
institutional framework that acknowledges individual workers’ 
work experiences and job-based skills outside each internal labor 
market. Consequently, the middle and upper strata of the Japanese 
labor market have been balkanized into a series of internal labor 
markets. While there is frequent labor mobility at the lower stratum 
of low-paid non-regular positions and that of employments in small 
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Schools 
Internal Labor Markets 
Non-regular 
employment 
Regular 
employment 
Promotion Promotion 
Labor mobility 
Labor 
Mobility 
Labor 
Mobility 
enterprises, there is very limited horizontal and upward labor 
mobility at the middle and upper strata (Figure 2) (Hamaguchi, 
2009; Ogoshi, 2006).  
 
Figure 2: Labor Market Structure in Japan 
  
 
One specific hiring practice of the Japanese corporations has 
directly contributed to the balkanization of labor market. The 
entrance to an internal labor market is largely limited to the blanket 
hiring of new school graduates every April (Honda, 2009). This is 
very different from hiring practices in the U.S., where multiple entry 
points in each company are accessible from the external labor 
market and where age discrimination is legally prohibited 
(Miyasaka, 2002; Takeuchi, 1994). With the presupposition of 
internal labor flexibility, the Japanese enterprises choose suitable 
applicants according to the perceived “latent ability” rather than 
their concrete skills (Honda, 2009). When a position becomes vacant, 
an employee already in the internal labor markets is chosen to fill 
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that position.  
This institutional arrangement limits the career prospects of 
both non-regular and regular employees. If a new school graduate 
fails to obtain regular employment and becomes a non-regular 
worker, he or she will be confined to non-regular or low-paid 
regular employment in small enterprises for the rest of his or her life. 
One research finding suggests that among young workers (15 to 34 
years old), 64.7% of them who become non-regular workers within a 
year after graduation still hold non-regular positions. The research 
was conducted in 2009 when only 18.7% of those who obtained 
regular positions within a year after graduation were non-regular 
workers (Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare, 2010: 18). In other 
words, once a young person becomes a non-regular worker, that 
employment status tends to be an ascribed one. Regular employees, 
in contrast, are given career opportunities but only within his or her 
current enterprise. Once dismissed, a former regular employee may 
only find a non-regular position. Therefore, in practice, regular 
employees do not have an “exit option.”  
This situation places many regular employees at the 
managers’ mercy and force them to accept the need to work 
overtime. While the person-based pay system within the internal 
labor market is one of the reasons for the balkanization of labor 
market, the dysfunction of the general labor market obscures the 
wage determination mechanism within each internal labor market. 
In Europe and the U.S., the “market prices” of labor in each job 
category function as the criteria of determining wage within the 
internal labor market. Since there is no established job-based 
“market price” of labor outside of Japan’s internal labor markets, 
there is no fair and objective criterion for determining wage (Ogoshi, 
2006).   
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iv. The Characteristics of the Japanese Enterprise 
-based Unions 
The ultra-cooperative stance of the enterprise-based unions in Japan 
was once seen as a mere expression of the traditional group loyalty. 
This culturalist view completely ignores the importance of 
institutional constraints. Once the labor union activities are confined 
to an enterprise, the institutional arrangements have framed the 
interests that workers could realistically have and the strategies that 
they could feasibly use. Since advancing within the current 
company is the only feasible strategy for the regular employees to 
maintain and enhance their livelihood, the long-term well-being of 
the enterprise by winning inter-company competition through 
collaborating with the managers becomes their priority (Kumazawa, 
1996:147). 
When the postwar labor unions lost their confrontational 
stance, they retreated from many workplace issues, especially the 
better treatment of individual employees. They rarely intervened in 
issues concerning evaluation, overtime work, job transfer, noruma 
(work quotas) set by the managers, and personnel reduction 
(Kumazawa, 2010). Given the unions’ unwillingness to intervene in 
these labor issues, individual employees are left defenseless as they 
are driven to compete and overwork, sometimes literally to death. 
In many karoshi lawsuits, the enterprise unions often side with the 
management and defend the corporations, insisting that the 
corporations bear no responsibility for the overwork of the victims 
(ibid.). Historically, the labor unions have paid high prices for 
workers’ job security and steady wage increases through 
compromising with the management. However, the unions have 
become so “cooperative” that they cannot contest even when the 
promises of job security and steady wage raises are unilaterally 
discarded by the managers in the recent neoliberal reforms (ibid.).  
Most enterprise-based unions do not concern themselves 
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with the exploitation of workers by subcontractors even when the 
parent corporation makes a large profit by imposing unreasonable 
demands on subcontractors. The enterprise unions also tend to 
exclude non-regular employees from their union membership and 
pay no attention to the discriminatory treatment of non-regular 
workers. The current predicaments of working people in Japan have 
originated from the managers’ attempts at rationalization and labor 
cost reduction. This working logic of capitalism, however, is 
universal and the enterprise-based unions should share the blame 
for allowing these management strategies to go unchecked (ibid.).  
 
3. The Governmental Technology built into the 
Institutions of Labor Relations２６ 
Focusing on the structural features of the institutional arrangements 
of labor relations alone cannot fully explain the karoshi and 
karojisatsu syndromes. The Japanese corporations should not be 
seen as labor camps where people are forced to work to death. Then 
why do the Japanese employees work as hard as they do? The 
answer lies in their subjective orientations towards the workplaces. 
What follows is a critique of the longstanding culturalist explanation 
of the work ethics of Japanese employees. The critique 
re-conceptualizes the exploitative institution of labor relations as a 
technology of power that influences the employees’ subjective 
orientation. 
 
a. Is Japanese Culture Killing Employees?  
The subjective orientation of hard work among the Japanese 
employees has often been attributed to their “loyalty to the 
corporation,” “collectivism,” and “sense of belonging to the 
corporation.” Ronald Dore (1982), for example, contrasts the 
Japanese workers with their British and American counterparts: 
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Toyota workers “belong to” their firm; British and American 
workers “work for” their firm―have an employment contract 
with it (X hours a week performance of Y of job function for Z 
pounds or dollars). … A [Japanese] worker’s willingness to 
offer his ideas and extra efforts to promote the company’s 
success depends in part on a sense of belonging to the firm, 
on the ability of the firm to mobilize what one might call 
“membership motivation” as opposed to “market motivation” 
… (xxvii - xxviii). 
 
This “sense of belonging” or “membership motivation” assumed to 
exist among the Japanese has often been explained culturally in the 
context of nihonjinron (Japaneseness Debate) until the middle of the 
1990s.２７ According to Nakane Chie (1967), the Japanese prioritize 
the group to which they belong over individual statuses and 
professional qualifications. The institutional specificities such as job 
security and seniority-based wage within the Japanese corporations 
are thought to sustain the employees’ sense of belonging and 
loyalty. 
Critically speaking, Ronald Dore’s interpretation of the 
“membership motivation” is ambivalent. On the one hand, he 
indicates that such form of motivation is fostered and mobilized by 
institutional arrangements and managers’ intent. On the other hand, 
he suggests that such group-orientated “national character” may be 
derived from “cultural difference,” and he uses the notion of the 
“Confucian virtue of benevolence” as one possible explanation for 
this uniquely Japanese style of authority (Dore, 1982: xxix-xxxi). An 
explicitly nihonjinron-type of discourse has lost much of its 
popularity since the mid-1990s. However, this culturalist framework 
that emphasizes the importance of Japanese collectivism is still 
shared even by the critics of karoshi syndromes. Most notably, 
Inoue Tatsuo, a leading liberal political philosopher, relates karoshi 
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to the “excessive communal cohesion” of corporation, which 
embodies “the more general communitarian character of Japanese 
society” (Inoue, 1993: 539, 2001: 61-62). 
What is common in the culturalist discourse is that certain 
ethos and psychological traits are deduced from the observable 
behaviors and thought to be nation-specific. These “cultural” traits 
are implicitly assumed to be deep-rooted and residing outside of 
history, and they are viewed as the ultimate causes of various 
concrete social phenomena and specific institutional characteristics. 
Generally speaking, this culturalist frame of reference filters out two 
interrelated perspectives essential for understanding the social 
reality: history and power relations. What the culturalist perspective 
overlooks are the complex and contingent historical processes of 
struggles that have shaped the current institutional forms and 
power relations within these modern institutions, and that continue 
to affect the behaviors and subjective orientations of individuals.  
Are the Japanese regular employees really “collectivists” with 
a strong sense of “membership motivation”? If so, what kind of 
“collectivists” are they? Should they be blamed for causing karoshi? 
When the early postwar unions claimed “equality as the same 
members of the corporation,” the idea was strongly influenced by 
the hegemonic wartime nationalist ideology. The unions employed 
this ideological rationale as a strategy to push their demands rather 
than as an expression of their cultural values. Moreover, as several 
scholars of nationalism suggest, the spread of modern nationalist 
discourse has a tendency to emphasize cultural uniqueness over 
individual agency, but this discourse turns out to be part of the 
state’s deliberate attempt at mobilizing the population for 
modernization and nation-state building. The problematic claim 
about cultural uniqueness should be viewed as an integral part of 
the modernizing process (Balibar, 1991; Brass, 1991; Breuilly, 1982; 
Calhoun, 1993, 1994; Gellner, 1983; Hobsbawm, 1990; Hobsbawm 
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and Ranger eds., 1983; Nairn, 1977; Nishikawa, 1995). Whether the 
discourse of “membership” and “cultural collectivism” is utilized by 
the state or by vulnerable groups such as industrial workers, the 
spread of such a discourse has strong political and strategic 
implications because it is not necessarily a mere expression of 
traditional culture; it is often an instrumental rational means in the 
process of power negotiation among different political sectors.２８  
Seen from this perspective, I reject the dualism of power and 
subjectivity, and the widespread misconception of karoshi 
syndrome as being resulted from “collectivism” and “communal 
cohesion.” My study regards this culturalist discourse as part of the 
labor management technology that justifies the karoshi and 
karojisatsu syndromes. While the employees’ willful hard work is 
certainly involved in the cases of karoshi and karojisatsu, this does 
not mean that the working of power is absent. According to 
Kumazawa Makoto (1997, 1998, 2010), the Japanese employees are 
driven to overwork through a powerful mechanism of kyōsei sareta 
jihatsusei (coerced volunteerism or forced spontaneity):２９“the fusion 
of self-motivated action with a compulsion of which they 
[employees] are only dimly aware” (1996: 68). Along this line of 
reasoning, I draw on the Foucauldian perspective of disciplinary 
power and governmentality to analyze the Japanese labor 
relations.３０ 
Michel Foucault (2003, 2007) defines the term “government” 
as “conduct of conduct,” that is “a more or less methodical and 
rationally reflected ‘way of doing things’, or ‘art’, for acting on the 
actions of individuals, taken either singly or collectively, so as to 
shape, guide, correct and modify the ways in which they conduct 
themselves” (Burchell, 1993: 267). Here, the fundamental character 
of government as a mode of power is to presuppose the freedom of 
the governed (Foucault, 1982: 221). This perspective overcomes “the 
dualism of freedom and constraint, consensus and violence” and 
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draws attention to indirect techniques of leading and controlling 
individuals (Lemke, 2002: 60). With this perspective in mind, 
employees’ willful hard work does not need to be reduced to their 
“cultural ethos” that exists outside of power relations. This 
analytical insight opens a way to examine the possible influences of 
labor management techniques on employees even when they 
voluntarily work themselves to death.  
 
b. The Evaluation System as a Panopticon 
Given the absence of a general labor market, the fate of each 
employee is largely determined within the internal labor market of 
each corporation. Peter B. Doeringer and Michael J. Piore (1971) 
argue that the internal labor market should be “distinguished from 
the external labor market of conventional economic theory” because it 
is “an administrative unit ... in which the pricing and allocation of 
labor is governed by a set of administrative rules and procedures” 
(1-2). More specifically, the evaluation system in each internal labor 
market determines each employee’s career. In the Japanese 
corporations where the evaluation criteria are ambiguous, what is 
being evaluated is the whole person, not just his or her skills 
(Kumazawa, 1997: 47). While the criteria remain ill-defined, it is the 
conventional wisdom among salarymen (i.e., male regular 
employees) that the criteria include “sociability,” “willingness to 
work hard and flexibly,” and “showing loyalty to the company at 
the expense of private life” (Kumazawa, 1995a). Kumazawa Makoto 
(1993, 1995a, 1996, 1997) highlights the notion of seikatsu-taido, 
literally translated as “life-attitude,” as the focus of evaluation. 
Therefore, the salarymen are expected to organize their entire lives 
around the company. 
These expectations are implicitly communicated through 
company rituals and symbolic devices such as company mottos, 
company songs, company badges and logs, and even shabo 
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(company cemeteries) (Sataka, 1991, 1996).３１ Graham Sewell (1998) 
calls this form of indirect labor management through organizational 
values “ideational control”: “Those who share these values can 
deduce from general statements almost limitless number of rules 
and targets to guide their own behavior under changing conditions” 
(408). This is typical of “post-bureaucratic” control in which the 
shared meaning “obviates the need for the principles of hierarchy 
and explicit rule-governed procedure” (ibid.). 
However, the Japanese managers used a more general 
discursive resource for ideational control at least until the early 
1990s. The extremely popular discourse of nihonjinron３２ served as 
an implicit evaluative criterion in the corporate settings. This 
discourse refers to shūdanshugi (collectivism) and chūseishin (loyalty 
to one’s corporation) as the central qualities of Japanese employees 
and identifies the corporation as a kind of Gemeinschaft. Yoshino 
Kosaku (1992) treats nihonjinron as a social phenomenon by looking 
at how and by whom the discourse has been transmitted and 
consumed, respectively. He finds the Japanese business elites and 
educators to have played the prime role in consuming and 
reformulating the discourse, and disseminating it to employees and 
to the public (ibid.). Sometimes, writings on nihonjinron are put on 
the list of recommended readings for new employees (ibid: 139). 
Lectures on this “collectivist” Japanese culture are given during the 
first few training seminars. Moreover, some leading managers 
publish on this topic, and the corporations (often the personnel 
departments) have incorporated the nihonjinron discourse in their 
textbooks, handbooks and glossaries (ibid: 170-176).３３ 
Why do the managers spend so much time and effort 
propagating this discourse among the employees? During the early 
job training sessions, the newly hired young salarymen do not learn 
so much about their actual job. They do not even know what job will 
be assigned to them after the training period. Instead, they focus on 
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learning the most desirable attitude of a good salaryman. It is 
over-simplistic to assume that newcomers are brainwashed into 
believing in the nihonjinron discourse. However, the young recruits 
can easily infer the corporate messages from the lectures on 
“Japanese culture.” They surely learn, and the managers expect 
them to learn, about what “life-attitude” the corporation values 
most for career advancement. Therefore, the young salarymen 
understand that this discourse is an important ideology of the 
corporation by which they are to be evaluated. If the evaluative 
criteria of job performance implicitly shown in the discourse are 
explicated, it will be as follows: “have a sense of belonging to the 
company Gemeinschaft, show your loyalty to this collectivity, 
devoting yourself to your job while sacrificing your private life and 
leaving all the family and community matters to your wife, and be 
flexible and willing to take whatever job you are ordered to do, then 
we will promote you.” Simply put, the powerful discourse functions 
as what Foucault calls a “normalizing discourse” (Foucault, 1995).３４  
The young salarymen are to be evaluated by the managers 
according to these stereotypes of “normal” employees as 
“collectivist,” hard working, and loyal. In my view, the whole 
evaluation system under this normalizing discourse works as what 
Foucault calls a “panopticon.” There is no physical, architectural 
structure of panopticon in the evaluation system. But the system 
produces panoptic effects―employees’ heightened awareness of the 
constant and ubiquitous possibility of being watched and evaluated by 
their superiors for the explicit results of their given tasks and for 
every of their actions and attitudes. The more ambiguous the 
evaluative criteria are, the more extensive the field of panoptic 
vision is. The employees are well aware of the possibility of being 
evaluated when wondering if they do overtime without reporting it, 
and whether they participate “willingly” and “enthusiastically” in 
the Quality Control (QC) and other officially “voluntary” activities 
 Social and Cultural Research Occasional Paper No.12 
 
30 
organized by the corporation. Once they participate in these 
“voluntary” activities, they are still being evaluated; such activities 
result in the extension of the panoptic gaze; this mechanism of 
discipline and control is self-perpetuating and permeates every level 
of labor relations.  
While this type of employee control mechanism can be called 
“post-bureaucratic,” we should not overlook the clear bureaucratic 
hierarchy that determines who evaluates whom and that structures 
a chain of panoptic surveillance. Apart from those employees at the 
bottom and at the top of the hierarchy, most salarymen have to be 
both the evaluator and the evaluated. The panoptic mechanism is 
embedded in the chain of human relationships among salarymen. 
While this mode of surveillance is common in any bureaucratic 
organizations, a salaryman has to discipline his subordinates 
according to their “life attitudes,” including their willingness to 
work overtime at the expense of private and family life, and he 
knows that he will be evaluated by his superiors in the same way.  
It is hard to recognize the exclusive source of power in such 
workplace relations. While the bureaucratic hierarchical order in the 
chain of evaluation clearly shows the asymmetric power relations 
among salarymen, each salaryman is simultaneously a target and a 
wielder of power. This chain of power relations with the expected 
disciplinary role of supervisors is a major source of harassment in 
the workplace. In 1999, a thirty-six year-old engineer burned himself 
to death in the wake of enormous overtime and constant 
harassments by his superior, who repeatedly told him to take his 
wedding ring off on the job and not to bring family issues to the 
workplace. According to the harasser, such actions showed his lack 
of “yaruki” (enthusiasm and dedication) (Kumazawa, 2010: 309). Yet 
Kumazawa Makoto’s penetrating analysis reveals that the offenders 
in many harassment cases are themselves the victims of stringent 
labor management (ibid: 274-275).  
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The efficacy of this labor management technology lies in its 
indirect way of leading employees to do unpaid overtime. It is a 
common strategy for the Japanese corporations to blur the 
distinction between “mandatory” and “voluntary,” and between 
working and off-work hours (Fuchini and Fuchini, 1990; Kumazawa, 
1996, 2010; Weathers and North, 2009). As shown in the previous 
example, even when a salaryman is pressured by his superior to do 
excessive amounts of overtime, it often takes a form of disciplining 
his own “life attitude” rather than an explicit order. When the 
employees “voluntarily” do unpaid overtime and participate in the 
Quality Control activities that are officially labeled as “voluntary” 
and “off-work” (i.e., unpaid), the corporation can easily save 
enormous labor costs. This is justified because no explicit directive 
to get involved in these activities has been given to the employees. 
This logic has repeatedly presented by the corporations in their 
defenses in several karoshi lawsuits. The corporations dismiss any 
responsibility for the karoshi victims by claiming that the enormous 
amount of overtime the victims had done before their death was not 
ordered by their superiors and could not even be classified as 
“work,” and therefore the overtime was not under the supervision 
of the corporations.３５ Thus, the indirect technique to induce the 
employees to unpaid overwork is a very effective means of labor 
cost reduction. But this indirect technique often blinds us from 
recognizing the operation of power mechanisms and leads to 
extremely tragic outcomes. 
 
c. The Game to Accumulate Membership Capital 
While the Japanese labor management technique appears to be a 
panopticon, it differs from the disciplinary power exercised in total 
institutions such as prisons, army barracks and labor camps where a 
direct disciplinary power is combined with panoptic surveillance 
(Foucault, 1995). The panoptic gaze of evaluation in the Japanese 
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corporations is designed to determine winners and losers through 
intense peer competition within the given internal labor markets.３６ 
This technique works insofar as the employees have an interest in 
winning the competition. Therefore, it is a technique to govern the 
employees indirectly through a competitive game, utilizing their 
willingness to participate in the game. In the Foucauldian terms, this 
mode of control is typical of “neoliberal government”:  
 
Homo œconomicus is someone who pursues his own interest, 
and whose interest is such that it converges spontaneously 
with the interest of others. From the point of view of a theory 
of government, homo œconomicus is the person who must be 
let alone. With regard to homo œconomicus, one must 
laissez-faire; he is the subject or object of laissez-faire. ... [H]omo 
œconomicus, that is to say, the person who accepts reality or 
who responds systematically to modifications in the variables 
of the environment, appears precisely as someone 
manageable, someone who responds systematically to 
systematic modifications artificially introduced into the 
environment. Homo œconomicus is someone who is eminently 
governable. From being the intangible partner of laissez-faire, 
homo œconomicus now becomes the correlate of a 
governmentality which will act on the environment and 
systematically modify its variables (Foucault, 2008: 270-271). 
 
Following this line of reasoning, Thomas Lemke (2001) 
explains that the neoliberal governmental technique “focuses not on 
the players, but on the rules of the game, not on the (inner) 
subjugation of individuals, but on defining and controlling their 
(outer) environment” (10). In the governmental technology widely 
adopted in the Japanese workplaces, the role of surveyor is 
entrusted to the employees themselves who discipline their 
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subordinates in order to win the peer competition. In my view, this 
control technology cunningly combines a direct disciplinary power 
with the neoliberal government to form a neoliberal disciplinary power. 
The methodological task here is to analyze the dynamics of such 
competitive game through which the employees are governed. By 
studying the competitive game at its distinctive level of institutional 
reality (i.e., without reducing it to individual ethos and national 
culture), it is necessary to combine Pierre Bourdieu’s “field theory” 
with the Foucauldian perspective.  
According to Pierre Bourdieu, a “field” is a unit of game in 
which a field-specific species of “capital” is distributed and pursued 
by the game players in accordance with its specific rules.３７ While 
the social space of Japanese corporation as a field does not 
determine each and every practice within it, the field differentiates 
those successful practices of the field-specific goals from those 
unsuccessful ones. This conveys to the game-players certain job 
strategies while excluding others. In this case, both the evaluation 
system and the discourse of collectivism serve as a panopticon that 
defines the available strategies in the field and structures the 
competitive game.  
In Bourdieu’s perspective, spreading the cultural nationalist 
discourse and other organizational values should be understood as 
a form of “symbolic violence” that determines what counts as “high” 
in the “capital” in this field. The accumulation of such symbolic 
capital is believed to generate more positive evaluations for the 
employees. I would like to propose the term “membership capital” 
to analyze such competitive practices within the Japanese 
corporations as a field. My argument is that the salarymen are 
induced to accumulate “membership capital,” a form of nameless 
and formless resources, in order to win the game. The salarymen 
have a dull but sure sense of understanding about certain degrees of 
“membership” within the corporations. Whoever can “prove” to be 
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most deeply belonging and loyal to the corporations will acquire the 
highest membership capital and deserve promotion.  
 But what constitutes one’s membership capital in Japan’s 
corporations? Any occupational ability that contributes to 
profit-making is counted towards one’s membership capital. 
However, the obscurity of this game is that occupational ability 
alone is not good enough to win the game. Seniority also constitutes 
part of the membership capital. “Enthusiastic” participation in any 
unpaid corporate-related activities after work “proves” a person as a 
“loyal company man,” and this is the most straightforward way of 
accumulating the membership capital. Doing overtime work 
without reporting it (i.e., service overtime) and “sacrificing” one’s 
private and family life are included too. All the activities express the 
notion of collectivism most valued by the corporations. The largest 
Japanese corporations are rife with these practices.  
Yokota Hamao (1997), who has worked for a major Japanese 
bank for more than ten years, presents some extreme cases. If a 
salaryman shows even the slightest interest in his family, his 
evaluation will suffer considerably (90). The bankers are also 
involved in a game of displaying their “self-sacrifices” 
conspicuously. Once a private railroad union went on strike, some 
of the bankers used the opportunity to show their “loyalty” by 
finding other ways of getting to work. One banker left his home at 
03:00 am, spending hours walking to the office. Other bankers, 
learning about the strike next day, did not go home the night before 
and slept in the office (Yokota, 1998: 226-232). Showing one’s 
absolute “devotion to work” by coming to the office with a high 
fever always won the admiration of their supervisors (Yokota, 1999: 
149-152). Inhumane as it seems, doing “service overtime” is almost 
taken for granted as being a good salaryman (Yokota, 1995: 27, 1996: 
242, 1999: 224). 
 The normalizing discourse of cultural nationalism and 
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organizational values in the Japanese corporations often invoke 
employees’ subjective “inner world,” and assume the unity of action 
and motivation. But what are actually evaluated are the public 
actions and behaviors of employees. To the extent that the 
employees are willing to play the game, they have to be sensitive to 
others’ evaluative gaze and to act consciously as “hardworking 
salarymen”; they have to pretend to be “loyal to the company” on the 
“front stage.” This is exactly what Erving Goffman (1959) calls 
“dramaturgical” action for “impression management.” Jurgen 
Habermas (1984) distinguishes the Weberian concept of “rational 
action” into communicative action (i.e., action oriented towards 
reaching “understanding”) and strategic action (i.e., action oriented 
towards “success”) (341). With this distinction in mind, Habermas 
stresses that the Goffmanian dramaturgical action can be sincere, 
presenting the actor’s subjectivity in social action or in strategic 
action aimed at achieving other goals (Goffman, 1959: 17-18; 
Habermas 1984: 93-94). Insofar as the salarymen play the game 
willingly, their dramaturgical action will remain strategic.  
In other words, we should not accept salarymen’s “loyalty to 
the company” as their deepest motivation as claimed by the 
culturalist explanation. There is no doubt that some salarymen try to 
keep a double consciousness―distinguishing their “true self” (the self 
that is true to them) from their “acting self.”３８  Indeed, many 
salarymen perceive a sharp gap between honne (true motive) and 
tatemae (a formally-established principle) (Sugimoto, 1997). ３９ 
While this gap can be discerned in the corporate settings worldwide, 
the gap in the Japanese corporation is the widest because of the 
fundamental contradiction in the salarymen’s actions and 
orientations induced by the labor management technique. In order 
to benefit personally, salarymen have to act out their “selfless” 
devotion to the corporations: the ends and the means to achieve the 
ends assume totally opposite forms. 
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 Living with this double consciousness can cause considerable 
strains as revealed in this tragic case of karojisatsu. A twenty-three 
year-old male salesman committed suicide after considerable 
overwork. He left a suicide note: “I have made myself pleasant to 
others all the time [in the workplace]. Such a life is not worth living” 
(Kumazawa, 2010: 266). This young salesman were always under 
pressure to do “emotional labor” not only towards his clients but 
also towards his co-workers by forcing himself to be “pleasant,” 
which he could no longer stand. So far as the employees cannot 
show their “true self” and communicate candidly with each other, it 
will be extremely difficult for them to develop genuine relationships 
and solidarity among themselves. They are painfully isolated even 
in their everyday face-to-face interactions.  
Then, what kinds of “collectivists” are the salarymen who are 
willing to play the game to accumulate their membership capital? 
Kumazawa Makoto (1995a, 1996, 1997, 1998, 2010) has consistently 
argued that what has characterized the Japanese workplace since the 
1970s is the existence of individualistic, egotistic, and harsh 
competition as opposed to the workers’ autonomous collectivism in 
Great Britain, where workers defended themselves collectively 
against the management’s divisive policy such as individual 
evaluation and incitement of competitions. I refer to this type of 
workers’ autonomous collectivism as collectivism from below, which is 
very weak in Japan. I characterize the egotistic game to show one’s 
“loyalty to the company” under the panoptic gaze of evaluation as 
collectivism from above.  
In the egotistic game, the loudest “collectivist” voice (i.e., “we 
have to do this for the company!”) often comes from those who most 
egotistically aspire to “make it” individually and who eagerly prove 
their loyalty by secretly reporting to the managers any coworkers 
critical of the management (Yokota, 1997, 1999). This form of 
collaboration sustains the pervasive web of surveillance networks. 
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The Quality Control group activities, sometimes seen as an 
“expression of Japanese collectivism,” illustrate the absence of 
autonomous solidarity among workers. These group activities are 
aimed at reducing staffing levels through rationalization and at 
depriving fellow workers of jobs. For example, a major union in 
Japan’s iron industry accepted a productivity-indexed wage system 
in which the fruits of personnel reduction were returned to the 
remaining workers as part of their wages (Kumazawa, 1996). In 
contrast, American workers at a U.S. Matsuda auto plant rejected 
such an idea: “I’m not against worker involvement or improving 
quality, and [sic] I wouldn’t make a suggestion that would take 
away someone’s job” (Fuchini and Fuchini, 1990: 212). The Japanese 
blue-collar workers clearly exhibit weaker “collectivism from below” 
than their American counterparts.  
This does not suggest that collectivism from below is 
completely absent in the Japanese workplace. In reality, the two 
types of “collectivism” are intermingled and often hard to 
distinguish. When a salaryman works overtime every day and 
sacrifices his private life, it may be because he is motivated by his 
aspiration for promotion or conversely because he genuinely cares 
about his colleagues and tries to lessen their workloads. In the latter 
case, the two opposing orientations do not appear as contradictory 
and thus, the salarymen seldom need to or cannot distinguish their 
own different motivations. This failure to separate the two types of 
orientations in one’s subjective understanding and practice 
reinforces the efficacy of collectivism from above.  
The two opposing types of collectivism clearly manifest when 
the employees are dismissed. A telling example is a middle manager 
who was ordered by the upper managers to dismiss several of his 
subordinates (Yukan Fuji, 2001: 151-153). The upper managers 
usually prefer to have their employees “voluntarily” quit in order to 
elude a labor law that restricts the conditions of dismissal. So the 
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middle manager constantly hounded the targets of dismissal until 
the subordinates decided to quit. He believed that he himself would 
not be dismissed if he faithfully carried out the superiors’ order. 
There was growing discontent among the remaining employees 
with the company’s harsh dismissal policy. Upon completing his 
task and assuming the onus of the harsh treatment of employees, the 
middle manager was fired. The middle manager was trying to “save 
his own skin” (egotistic direction), but the meaning of his action to 
carry out the management’s order and to betray his co-workers was 
justified by himself under the pretense of “showing loyalty to the 
corporation.” He naively expected the superiors to interpret his 
action in this way so that he could stay on his job, but he had clearly 
misjudged the situation.  
The “collectivist” discourse and the system to judge the 
employees’ loyalty had shaped this middle manager’s way of 
thinking. He adhered to the strategy of showing loyalty available to 
the employees, but sadly, the management dictated this strategy and 
could always twist it to advance the corporate interests. After being 
fired, the middle manager deeply regretted his previous action, 
explaining that he should have joined his subordinates to protest the 
company’s inhumane dismissal policy (ibid.). He acknowledged 
confronting two completely opposite options: (1) saving his own 
skin by showing loyalty to the company (i.e., adhering to 
collectivism from above), and (2) remaining loyal to his co-workers 
as concrete individuals, developing solidarity and collectively 
opposing the dismissal policy (i.e., expressing collectivism from 
below). 
Given the difficulty of distinguishing these two types of 
“loyalty” among the Japanese workers and the pressure for them to 
display their “membership motivation,” they were trapped in very 
obscure institutional conditions. When the culturalist discourse was 
employed to reinforce the harsh evaluation system, the 
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governmental technology would structure the whole game for the 
employees to accumulate their membership capital. Then, the 
producers of the culturalist discourse would look at the salarymen’s 
everyday demonstration of their commitment and loyalty as the 
“empirical evidence” of their “collectivist” tendency. The culturalist 
discourse and the governmental technology not only strengthened 
one another, but also created a vicious cycle of workplace 
interactions and a powerful mechanism of control within the 
Japanese corporations until the early 1990s. Once placed in this 
perspective, it is misleading to overlook these institutional factors 
and identify the salarymen’s “motivational orientation” as a mere 
expression of the Japanese “national character.” The culturalist 
perspective also obscures the complexity of historical process in 
which the Japanese workers’ “collectivism from below” has been replaced 
by “collectivism from above” in the postwar management-union 
struggles. This has been a gradual but decisive change which gives 
rise to the frequent occurrences of karoshi and karojisatsu.  
 
d. The Enterprise Culture Discourse and the Neoliberal 
Reforms 
Starting in the mid-1990s, the Japanese managers began to utilize a 
new discourse that is seemingly the exact opposite of the culturalist 
discourse. In 1995, the Nikkeiren (1995), a powerful association of 
the Japanese corporation managers, called on its members to reduce 
the number of regular employees by hiring more non-regular 
employees, to reduce the significance of seniority in determining 
regular employees’ wage levels, and to use a more result-oriented 
evaluation. At the same time, the Nikkeiren encouraged the 
managers to respect their employees’ individuality and to help them 
establish ko no shutaisei (individual autonomy), jiritsusei 
(independence), and sekininkan (a sense of responsibility) (23-35). 
Faced with the intense global competition, the Japanese corporations 
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need creativity, which can be developed only through each 
employee’s jijo doryoku (relying on one’s efforts) (3), and ishiki 
kaikaku (reforming one’s consciousness) (48). 
This new managerial discourse is almost identical to the 
“enterprise culture” discourse propagated by Margent Thatcher in 
Great Britain and Ronald Reagan in the U.S. Emphasizing 
individual initiatives, independence, boldness, self-reliance and 
willingness to take risks and to accept responsibility for one’s action, 
this discourse is concomitant with the growing criticisms of a 
welfare state blamed for creating the “culture of dependency,” and 
with the neoliberal policies of bringing market-based logic of 
competition to various social areas that have hitherto been seen as 
outside of the economic (Keat, 1991; Heelas and Morris, 1992; Slater 
1997: 34-38; Slater and Tonkiss, 2001). But there is a noticeable 
difference. While the same discourse in Great Britain and the U.S. 
severely criticize the state’s welfare policies as too benevolent and 
inefficient, the Nikkeiren targets the “dependency mentality” of the 
Japanese regular employees. In other words, the longstanding 
benefits of job security and steady salary increases have to be 
eliminated in order to promote a sense of independence among 
Japanese workers. 
A number of scholars have drawn on Foucault’s study of 
“governmentality” to show that the spread of the “enterprise culture” 
discourse has been accompanied by the “neoliberal governmentality” 
as a new way of reorganizing power mechanisms and of regulating 
and utilizing the “autonomy” of individuals (Barry, Osborne, and 
Rose eds., 1996; Dean, 1999, 2002, 2002a; Gordon, 1991; Lemke, 2001, 
2002; Miller and Rose, 1992; Valverde, 1996). Besides its indirect 
technique of governing people through a game, the main 
characteristic of this governmental rationality is to influence how 
individuals govern themselves. This is exactly what Foucault calls 
the “technologies of the self” (Burchell, 1993; Cruikshank, 1993; 
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Foucault, 1988, 1993; Lemke, 2001, 2002; Valverde 1996). Here, the 
Japanese managers criticize the salarymen’s wrong way of governing 
themselves (e.g. “dependency mentality”) for causing the decline of 
the corporations’ performance, and urge them to “reform their 
consciousness.” 
 The new managerial discourse justifies the elimination of the 
job security and steady wage rise for regular employees, the further 
reduction of labor cost (Ogoshi, 2006: 134-135), and the new attempt 
at raising the productivity of regular white-collar employees 
(Kumazawa, 1997). Against this backdrop, the “result-oriented” 
evaluation system is introduced and the most popular institutional 
mechanism is called the “Management by Objectives” (MBO) 
system. 70% of the Japanese corporations have adopted this system 
(Joe, 2004: 26). This system sets aside specific work targets for each 
employee in the annual or biannual interview with the supervisor, 
who assesses whether the targets are fully achieved at the end of 
each evaluation period. The supervisor determines each employee’s 
work targets in relation to the overall objectives of the corporation, 
and he quantifies these targets in measurable terms such as the 
profit made by the employee (Kumazawa, 1997: 63-66; Joe, 2004: 
24-29). 
 We can discern a clear neoliberal rationality in the new 
managerial discourse and evaluation system. Under the intense 
competition, achieving individual objectives and making profit for 
the corporation would “profit” the salaryman. The salaryman is 
expected to be “entrepreneurial” in the internal labor market, which 
is supposed to obtain the quasi-market mechanism due to the 
reduced significance of seniority. On the other hand, as a 
“responsible” person, the salaryman should accept the 
consequences of his own failure to achieve the assigned job targets 
(i.e., lower wages and even dismissal), and should not blame the 
corporation, let alone collectively intervening in the corporation’s 
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policy of labor management. His failure of job performance has to 
do with his failure of self-governance. Thus, all the salarymen are 
instructed to calculate their own profits and costs, a practice that 
could motivate them to work more efficiently and to seek better 
ways of achieving the job objectives. In this way, any control from 
outside, especially the direct and detailed instructions from the 
supervisors, are expected to be replaced by the “technology of the 
self.” 
 There are considerable differences in how the MBO system is 
used in Japan and the U.S., where this system originated. Unlike 
Japan, the MBO system in the U.S. is not always directly linked to 
the performance appraisal. In addition, the system is usually 
applied to only exempt employees (i.e., managers and professionals) 
in the U.S., but it is applied to the rank-and-file employees in Japan 
(Ogoshi, 2006: 250-256). Furthermore, due to the person-based 
nature of the wage system, the lack of job analysis and that of 
established “market prices” of labor, there is no objective criterion 
about whether the assigned job targets are reasonable or not (ibid.: 
250-256, 285).  
Since the mid-1990s, the neoliberal governmentality of the 
Japanese corporations should be viewed as a continuous 
intensification of the neoliberal disciplinary power. From the 1970s 
onwards, the labor management technique has embodied a 
neoliberal character―the indirect government of employees through 
a competitive game. The panoptic mechanism of evaluation remains 
intact. Whether the employees are judged to be “collectivist” or 
“entrepreneurial” enough, they are still assessed according to their 
“life attitude.”  
The mechanism of evaluation encompasses many MBO 
interviews. Nominally, the supervisors are not supposed to impose 
the measurable objectives on their subordinates. Instead, the 
subordinates are supposed to decide on these objectives themselves. 
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But the supervisors often positively evaluate and praise the 
subordinates’ willingness to challenge difficult targets (Kumazawa, 
1997: 66; Mizoue, 2004: 254-255). From a Foucauldian perspective, 
the MBO system in Japan is typical of a governmental technology 
that induces a harsh “technology of the self.” Once the employees 
identify their job objectives, they feel compelled to achieve these 
difficult targets. After all, they decide these goals themselves. If they 
fail to accomplish the tasks, they are the one to blame. After 
fulfilling specific targets, the employee are expected to set more 
challenging targets for the next round of evaluation. Given the lack 
of objective standards, the level of targets is to be raised infinitely 
(Ogoshi, 2006: 285). 
Through the MBO system, therefore, the managers can 
induce their subordinates to accept unreasonable quotas (noruma) 
with impunity. In case the quotas are not met and overtime work 
incurs additional labor cost, the employees risk being labeled 
“incompetent,” receiving lower wages and being dismissed 
(Nakano, 2006: 26). Under the MBO system, the fear of 
unemployment has driven the employees to accept overtime work, 
and this has worsened the problems of karoshi and karojisatsu 
(Kumazawa, 2010: 169). 
 Has the old game to accumulate the membership capital 
vanished since the hegemonic discourse of management switched 
from the ideology of cultural nationalism to the new enterprise 
culture? The new managerial discourse proclaims that the 
salarymen are not required to be loyal to the corporation anymore; 
they should be loyal to their jobs only, and they ought to be 
autonomous, responsible and “empowered” individuals (Mizoue, 
2004: 125-126). Yet the change in the hegemonic discourse does not 
necessarily mean that the game to accumulate the membership 
capital has ceased to exist. As more regular employees are being 
replaced by the non-regular ones, the regular workers are 
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repeatedly warned: “There are agency-dispatched workers who can 
do your job at half of the salary you are receiving now!” (Nakano, 
2006: 66)  
With the rapid growth of the low-paid non-regular workers, 
the regular employees are pressured to prove that they deserve their full 
membership status by doing unpaid overtime willingly. Meanwhile, 
the secondary membership status of the non-regular employees, 
who have job insecurity and low wages, is rationalized by the 
higher demands on those regular employees with full membership. 
The burden of justifying the categorical discrimination of the 
non-regular employees has fallen on the regular employees, who 
have to accept heavier workloads and the exploitation of the 
low-paid, part-time staff. The result is what Nakano Mami (2006) 
calls “labor dumping”; both the regular and non-regular employees 
are forced to compete in lowering the price of their labor. But the 
form of their labor dumping depends on the employment category. 
While the non-regular workers’ overall wage has declined, the 
regular workers are driven to overwork and unpaid overtime. The 
postwar history of labor relations has shown that the experience of 
regular employees and that of non-regular employees are not 
exclusive but rather mutually constitutive of each other.  
 
e. The Overall Mechanism to Drive Regular Employees 
into Overwork 
The neoliberal disciplinary power works so far as the employees are 
willing to wager on the competitive game in the internal labor 
market. The orientation of homo œconomicus, or economic human, 
who pursues one’s interest in winning the game and becomes 
“eminently governable” through the game (Foucault, 2008: 270), has 
to be formed outside of the game. At least two major incentives 
motivate the regular employees to wager on the competitive game 
within the internal labor market. One of these incentives is the 
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notion of status competition aimed at achieving an idealized 
“modern family” lifestyle―the chūryū (middle status) consumption 
lifestyle and the gender division of labor at home. This type of status 
competition emerged in early twentieth-century Japan when the 
white-collar workers or the “salarymen” stratum, portrayed as the 
most “civilized” segment of the population, strove to achieve an 
idealized image of “modern family” as promoted by the state 
agencies and the department stores (Koyama, 1999; Takeuchi, 1996, 
1997; Terade, 1994; Yamada, 1994). The negative portrayal of the 
blue-collar stratum was in sharp contrast with that of salarymen 
stratum, and this resulted in the harsh discrimination of the 
blue-collar workers.４０  
Under these circumstances, there was hardly any space for 
the development of a “working class public sphere.” Consequently, 
the blue-collar workers could not reject such negative stereotypes 
and develop their own distinctive lifestyle with pride and esteem. In 
the early postwar period, the blue-collar workers demanded the 
same salarymen status and they achieved it to some extent in the 
midst of “high economic growth” from the late 1950s to the 
mid-1970s. 
Owing to this development, the social imagery of sharp 
status distinction lost its currency in the postwar era. The other side 
of this equalization of aspirations for upward social mobility was 
that everyone was expected and pressured to achieve the same 
idealized lifestyle regardless of one’s economic position (Kumazawa, 
1996, 2010). The mass media disseminated countless images of an 
idealized family consumption lifestyle with many “must-have” 
household items. The status competition became a race in terms of 
who could realize such an economic ideal first; it was a competition 
in terms of time.４１  
When a sizable part of the population had realized the ideal, 
the mass media upgraded the image of idealized consumption 
 Social and Cultural Research Occasional Paper No.12 
 
46 
lifestyle with a new set of “must-have” items. The status 
competition was transformed into an endless “seesaw game of 
differentiation and homogenization” among Japanese families (Sato, 
1990: 150). The corporations also encouraged their employees to 
pursue a similar family consumption lifestyle and to divide labor at 
home along the gender line.４２ The gender division of labor was 
idealized and embedded in the whole institutional arrangements of 
Japan’s labor relations. This development not only severely limited 
female employees’ chance to pursue occupational success, but also 
pressured male regular employees to be primary breadwinners. 
These economic desires and pressures have led the male regular 
employees to wager on the competitive game in the internal labor 
market.４３  
Even when a salaryman abhors the game of showing “loyalty 
to the corporation” in the workplace, it is difficult for him to 
withdraw from the game. Yokota (1999), who disliked the intense 
competition in his bank and consequently quit, reflects on why he 
had felt compelled to gamble on the contest for promotion. He 
imagined how miserable he would be in his forties and fifties if his 
other dōki (salarymen hired in the same year with him) members 
were promoted over him and gave him orders. The sense of “misery” 
would be exacerbated by the differences in their salaries and 
consumption style. While other dōki members wore expensive suits 
and drove luxury cars, Yokota would have to tolerate wearing 
cheaper suits and driving economical vehicles. He envisioned how 
miserable his family members would be if they continued to live in 
the company housing. Other salarymen’s wives would despise his 
wife because of his career failure, and his children would be bullied 
at school too (256-259).  
Trying to save family members from such misery of shame 
constitutes an important part of salarymen’s “family responsibility.” 
Yokota abhorred the whole salarymen’s game for promotion. Yet, he 
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had no choice but to try to win the game because of the extensive 
material, social and psychological sanctions placed on the losers and 
their families. His ambivalence represents the “anguish of being a 
salaryman that can hardly be expressed in words” (259). 
In the current condition, even Yokota Hamao’s “anguish” 
sounds idyllic. The sanctions placed on the “losers” do not just 
symbolize the failure to maintain an idealized family lifestyle 
because of no salary raise and promotion. They also represent a 
sudden relegation to the status of working poor as a result of the 
dismissal. Thus, the perpetual fear of falling from their current 
social and economic position has driven many regular employees to 
wager on the competitive game in the internal labor market. Japan’s 
general labor market rarely allows the regular employees to 
maintain the same livelihood when they change their employers. 
Once getting dismissed from a job at middle age, the former regular 
employees are most likely to find non-regular employment only. But 
the non-regular workers are the most unfortunate ones as widely 
reported in mass media: when they are suddenly dismissed, some of 
them become homeless. The regular employees are acutely aware of 
this harsh reality. The more regular employees accept the wretched 
conditions of the non-regular workers, the more they fear falling 
into the status of working poor (Honda, 2009). Furthermore, due to 
the discrimination of female employees in the workplace, the wives 
of male regular employees receive no or little supplementary 
income. Most Japanese households never function as an institution 
of economic security. The news media and TV dramas have 
countless stories of family breakdown after the husbands lose their 
regular jobs. The job dismissal is indeed a life and death issue for the 
Japanese male regular employees. 
The economic desire and the fear of unemployment have 
driven the regular male employees to strategically subordinate 
themselves to the neoliberal disciplinary power of the internal labor 
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market (Figure 3).４４ Ever since the “high economic growth” period, 
the homogenized aspiration for consumption has reinforced the 
regular employees’ strategic subordination. After the burst of the 
bubble in the early 1990s and the implementation of subsequent 
neoliberal reforms, the fear of job insecurity has grown. The regular 
employees are driven to adapt to the intense competition in a 
desperate attempt to survive (Kumazawa 2010: 363). The strategic 
subordination certainly represents a type of social actors’ agency, a 
trend of development praised by the advocates of neoliberalism. 
Insofar as the employees’ agency is only limited to this 
individualistic competitive form, however, the more they exercise their 
agency, the deeper their subordination to the neoliberal disciplinary power 
becomes.  
 
Figure 3: The mechanism of strategic subordination 
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f. The Development of Governmental Technology 
The technology of governmental power in Japan’s labor market has 
been historically grounded. The wartime state mobilized and 
governed the population through an ideology that demanded 
absolute loyalty to the Japanese nation and that penalized anyone  
disloyal to the Empire.４５ The same form of power was grafted onto 
the postwar corporate sector. Institutionally, the unwritten 
agreement of job security created a relatively stable relationship 
between the corporations and its members similar to that between a 
nation-state and its population. How the Japanese corporation 
governed its (regular) employees is almost identical to how the 
wartime state employed nationalism to integrate the population.  
It is not a coincidence that the postwar managers 
appropriated the same nationalist discourse as part of their labor 
management strategy. Whether a “nation” or a “corporation,” the 
collectivity that serves as the object of loyalty is an “imagined 
community” (Anderson, 1983); this discursively constructed 
abstraction enables its “members” to imagine their belonging 
regardless of their concrete, direct relationship among one other 
(Calhoun, 1991). The power to impose an imagined community in 
Japan’s corporate world has actually driven the employees to 
compete against each other and to show the depth of their belonging 
to the collectivity. 
 The early postwar labor unions should be partially blamed 
for this transplantation of the governmental technology. While they 
demanded the equal treatment for blue- and white-collar employees 
under the wartime slogan of “full membership of the corporation,” 
they excluded the temporary and female workers from full 
membership status in their negotiations with the managers. The 
underlying logic of such exclusion was that the different level of 
“selfless devotion” to the “collectivity” required a different degree 
of “belonging to” the “collectivity” and therefore, justified 
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differential treatment. The managers’ use of the evaluation system 
and the cultural nationalist discourse further institutionalized the 
whole game of accumulating one’s membership capital.  
Consequently, the industrial workers needed to “prove” their 
loyalty to the “company collectivity” as the white-collar 
counterparts had done, and more deeply than the “secondary 
members.” But, since the mid-1990s, the managers saw this mode of 
governmental technology as too costly mainly because of the 
unwritten agreement of job security. Then, they switched to the 
enterprise culture discourse in order to further reduce the labor cost. 
This change was part of a larger reconfiguration of the hegemonic 
discourses in Japan.  
From the 1970s to the burst of bubble in the early 1990s, the 
cultural-economic nationalism (nihonjinron) was the hegemonic 
discourse. After the burst of the bubble, this culturalist discourse 
gave way to neoliberalism which idealized American capitalism.４６ 
The neoliberal disciplinary power within each internal labor market 
was modified to fit into the new discourse and became widely 
utilized. The rapid growth of the working poor has worsened the 
effects of this disciplinary power on the regular employees. To put 
in extreme terms, the Japanese workers have only the choice 
between the two extreme evils (i.e., karoshi or poverty).  
 
4. Conclusion 
This article has investigated the causes of karoshi and karojisatsu in 
Japan within the context of the country’s troublesome history of 
labor relations, the emergence of institutional specificities in labor 
control, and the impact of governmental technology embedded in 
these institutional arrangements on the everyday working life of 
people (Photo 1). The study re-conceptualizes what seemed to be the 
“cultural tendencies of the Japanese” as the effects of a modern 
technology of power. This technology of governmentality has 
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created a widespread misconception that karoshi is only caused by 
Japan’s “communal tendencies.” By utilizing Jürgen Habermas’ 
distinction between the “system” (the domain of instrumental 
rational action that integrates social actions through delinguistified 
steering media of “power” and “money”) and the “lifeworld” (the 
sphere of everyday communicative action aimed at mutual 
understanding) (Habermas, 1984, 1987), I argue that this technology 
of power belongs to the “system” while camouflaging itself as part 
of the “lifeworld” (i.e., as “cultural ethos”). In doing so, this power 
has encroached on the Japanese employees’ “lifeworld” and has 
pitted them against each other.４７ 
 
Photo 1. Family members of the karoshi victims at a press 
conference４８ 
 
 
 What I call the “neoliberal disciplinary power,” whether 
combined with the “collectivist” or “enterprise culture” discourse, 
has spread to other countries such as the U.S., Great Britain, Hong 
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Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, South Korea, and Mainland China. As a 
type of power technology, this mechanism of control is as 
transferable as any scientific technology. In Japan, the neoliberal 
disciplinary power on employees is deeply embedded in the specific 
institutional arrangements of labor relations. What has taken place 
in the U.S. and Great Britain over the past few decades is the process 
of institutional restructuring known as the “Japanization of labor 
relations.” The process is characterized by the deliberate attempts to 
expand the “single union agreements,” to move factories to the 
“greenfield sites” for confining union activities into “cooperative” 
directions, and to reduce job categories for internal flexibility and 
“Just-in-Time” production system. The institutional base of 
enforcing the technology of power has been firmly established in 
Japan and elsewhere.４９  
In East Asia where the “traditional Confucian value” is often 
invoked, the business corporations and other socio-economic 
institutions have embraced this technology of power as the 
totalizing cultural discourse. This study does not deny the influence 
of traditional cultures on the operation of modern societies and 
corporations. Nevertheless, one should not mistake the effects of 
modern technology of power for the prolonging influence of 
traditional cultural ethos. Otherwise, people in these Asian 
countries will never resolve the problems of karoshi and karojisatsu. 
The misunderstanding of karoshi as solely caused by the traditional 
culture leads to a wrong solution. When some Japanese liberalist 
thinkers regarded the tendency of employees to totally submit 
themselves to the corporation as motivated by their “communal” 
tendencies, they failed to comprehend the working of modern 
technology of power. As a result, their call for promoting more 
independent selves became similar to the enterprise culture 
discourse, and possibly justified the neoliberal reforms which had in 
turn intensified the frequent occurrences of karoshi and karojisatsu. 
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 What is needed to mitigate the predicaments of working 
people in Japan are not abstract calls for changing the employees’ 
subjectivity, but concrete institutional changes. Because the practice 
of karoshi-inducing overwork among regular employees and the 
wretched condition of non-regular employees are mutually 
constitutive, the institutional changes should be initiated to 
counteract the discrimination against non-regular employees and 
the governmental technology driving employees to karoshi. The 
countermeasures are as follows:  
 
1. To implement a “comparable worth” principle to reduce 
the discriminatory treatments of non-regular and female 
employees by linking job analysis to wage determination;  
2. To make evaluative criteria more objective, explicit, and 
gender-neutral against the panoptic gaze of evaluation;  
3. To provide “career ladder” opportunities to both regular 
and non-regular employees;  
4. To allow employees to switch from full-time to part-time 
positions and vice versa without lowering hourly wages;  
5. To close the wage gaps among employees by controlling 
the influence of individual evaluation on wages;  
6. To establish a society-wide system that fairly 
acknowledges each individual’s job experience and skills by 
standardizing job analysis procedures across the 
corporations;  
7. To set an upper limit on working hours and implementing 
“work-sharing” policies to shorten working hours and create 
new employments; and  
8. To reform the employment security system to cover the 
non-regular employees as beneficiaries, and to link that 
security system to job placement supports and occupational 
training.  
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Some of these recommendations may not be new. The 
organized workers and feminists worldwide have been fighting for 
these goals for decades. Many member states of the European Union 
have enforced these measures. Once the “cultural specificities of the 
Japanese employee” are demystified, the same institutional reforms 
can be implemented in Japan. However, these institutional changes 
can be possible only if the working people in Japan actively debate 
these issues both in workplaces and in the larger public sphere, 
establish consensus among them, and intervene into the labor 
management practices through “collectivism from below” and 
industrial democracy. Given the nature of globalizing capital, it is 
also important to develop the global networks of working people or 
to perform what Jeremy Brecher and Tim Costello (1998) call 
“globalization from below.” In Japan and elsewhere, the global 
agendas of working people should concern not only salary raise and 
job security, but also the way their working lives are governed. 
Implementing collective countermeasures against the governmental 
technologies globally is the key to our common struggle, protecting 
us from karoshi and karojisatsu, and making our working lives 
worth living. 
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Postscript  
When I finalized this article, the massive earthquake and tsunami 
hit Northeast Japan on March 11, 2011. The devastated areas are still 
assaulted by many aftershocks and the nuclear crisis is still 
immanent at this very moment. It is shocking and heartbreaking to 
see the hideous devastation and tragedies. At the same time, it is 
very heartening to witness the strong display of solidarity among 
the afflicted people in the devastated areas and to see people at 
home and abroad extending their helping hands to the sufferers.  
 The long-term effects of the calamities on the Japanese society 
and economy have begun to show themselves. In those industries 
directly and indirectly damaged by the calamities, many employers 
have dismissed their employees, especially the non-regular workers. 
Many non-regular employees are laid off without compensation and 
knowledge of whether and when they can return to work. Some 
employers not clearly affected by the devastation have dismissed 
both regular and non-regular employees because of the dim 
economic prospects. Many corporations have cancelled the 
assurance of hiring new school graduates. This historic natural 
disaster is likely to exacerbate the growth of non-regular employees, 
inequality, and poverty. In certain industries, the employees are 
working hectically to meet the new demands suddenly raised by the 
labor and resource shortages after the disaster. Constructors are 
bound to be busy during the whole reconstruction process. Even in 
other economic sectors, the reduction of employees to financially 
cope with the economic downturn is likely to worsen the problem of 
overwork among the remaining employees.  
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Photo 2. Many afflicted people who lost their means of living 
volunteered to help others in areas devastated by the earthquake 
and tsunami in 2011５０ 
 
 
I fear that the problems of karoshi and karojisatsu may 
become more serious among people who have not lost their jobs. 
Most of the Japanese employees do not mind working hard to 
rebuild the devastated regions and to improve the wellbeing of the 
country. But the management should not take advantage of this 
public sentiment to justify the longstanding practice of unpaid 
overwork. The reconstruction efforts and the overall economic 
recovery should not lead to more karoshi and karojisatsu cases. 
Otherwise, the disaster victims and their surviving family members 
will continue to endure these man-make tragedies as they had 
experienced the historic calamity on March 11, 2011. 
 The unprecedented scale of destruction and suffering faced 
by Japan this time is next to that of the Second World War. As with 
the early postwar society, it is perhaps the time to reexamine the 
whole social, economic and political systems of Japan in relation to 
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its overall recovery policy. Insofar as the exploitative institutional 
arrangements of labor relations remain intact, the effects of the 
devastation and the pressure for recovery are bound to intensify the 
problems of karoshi and poverty. In a time of economic stagnation, 
working hard does not necessarily help the victims because it may 
take away someone’s job. The reconstruction efforts have to be 
understood in both economic and social terms. More people should 
be allowed to participate in the recovery process through job 
creation programs. Existing work should be shared by as many 
people as possible, especially those refugees who lost the means of 
livelihood in the disaster. Therefore, service overtime should be 
eliminated and a policy of work-sharing ought to be enforced in 
order to make jobs available for everyone. At the same time, the 
discriminatory treatment of non-regular and female employees must 
be banned and more just labor policies should be put in place. These 
recommendations are essential for the recovery of the devastated 
communities and the country at large, and for mitigating the 
longstanding problems of karoshi and poverty. 
It may not be easy to deal with the karoshi and karojisatsu 
syndromes because of the need to address their complex 
institutional causes. But if the degree of human tragedy and their 
causes are clearly understood, people may show solidarity to 
mitigate the problems as we can see the same kind of solidarity that 
the public have displayed to help the disaster victims. After this 
historic disaster, people in Japan, including myself, are unlearning 
our atomized selves and relearning the vital importance of mutual 
help. Hopefully, this sense of empowering solidarity will lead us to 
overcome the gap between wealth and poverty, the atomization of 
working people, and the suppression of the working class identity 
by the technology of governmental power. 
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Glossary  
chūryū     中流 
chūseishin     忠誠心 
dōki      同期 
hi-seiki jyūgyōin    非正規従業員 
honne     本音 
ishiki kaikaku    意識改革 
jijo doryoku     自助努力 
jiritsusei     自立性 
jyūgyōin     従業員 
karojisatsu     過労自殺 
Karoshi    過労死 
Karoshi Hotline   過労死 110番 
Karōshi Taikoku   過労死大国 
ko no shutaisei    個の主体性 
Kōkoku kinrōkan    皇国勤労観 
kyōsei sareta jihatsusei   強制された自発性 
nihonjinron     日本人論 
nōryoku shugi    能力主義 
sābisu zangyō    サービス残業  
seika shugi    成果主義 
seikatsu-taido    生活態度 
seiki jyūgyōin    正規従業員 
sekininkan     責任感 
shabo      社墓 
shokkō     職工 
Shokunō Shikaku Seido   職能資格制度 
shūdanshugi     集団主義 
tatemae     建前 
The National Defense  過労死弁護団全国連絡会議 
Counsel for Victims of Karoshi   
yaruki     やる気 
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Notes 
 
１ I wish to express my gratitude to Joseph Tse-Hei Lee and Ronald K. Frank of 
Pace University for their comments and suggestions. 
２ The National Defense Counsel for Victims of Karoshi published a book 
(National Defense Counsel, 1992) and created its home page in English. 
Retrieved on November 1, 2010 from http://karoshi.jp/english/index.html  
３ According to the Institute of Labor Administration (2010), 63.5% of the 
interviewed enterprises had at least one employee absent from work due to 
mental disorders for a month or more in 2010. 
４ See http://karoshi.jp/english/overwork1.html 
５ For a persuasive discussion of the mixed success of those labor lawyers and 
activists, see Weathers and North (2009). 
６ The popular journal Ekonomisuto (25 July, 2006) featured a series of articles 
entitled Karoshi Taikoku (Karoshi Empire). 
７ Kumazawa Makoto (2010), a leading labor relations scholar in Japan, presents 
the most comprehensive study of karoshi and karojisatsu syndromes. His work 
carefully examines more than 50 concrete cases and reveals the spread of 
karoshi among all kinds of workers.  
８ There are two large sets of the government labor statistics in Japan. One set of 
data shows workers’ actual overtime; the other data include only reported 
overtime obtained from employers and thus, exclude service overtime. Neither 
set of data shows the amount of service overtime, although it can be estimated 
from the differences between the two sets of data. A few studies compare the 
working hours, including service overtime, of Japanese full-time workers with 
those of other countries, showing that Japanese full-time employees work much 
longer than employees in the U.S. and the European Union (Ogura, 2007:7-13). 
９ The following description of the postwar Japanese history of labor relations is 
a condensed version of chapter 3 in my Ph.D. dissertation (Shibata, 2007). 
１０  In the early postwar period, the U.S. Occupational Authority and the 
international labor activists were against the age-based wage; however, the 
local unions defended the “livelihood wage” system (Hamaguchi, 2009: 120). 
When the Labor Law was drafted, the “equal pay for equal work” principle was 
originally included. But the Japanese labor representatives indicated a 
contradiction between the “livelihood wage” system and the “equal pay for 
equal work” principle. As a result, the latter principle was replaced by a more 
ambiguous clause of prohibiting discrimination against female workers (ibid: 
108). 
１１ This wage structure was called “Densan-type wage structure” and adopted 
by many corporations. There is no consensus among the labor relations scholars 
about how to characterize the wage structure in relation to the “ability pay” 
portion. Gordon (1985: 355) emphasizes the aspect of egalitarianism in this 
wage structure by referring to it as “the logic of labor more than capital.” Endo 
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(1999) and Nomura (1994) stress the “ability” portion of the wage structure as 
the starting point of workers’ acceptance of wage differences based on the 
ambiguous merit evaluation. Given the strength of the unions at that time, the 
wage structure certainly expresses the logic of Japanese workers. In my view, 
we have to expose ambivalences within this “logic” itself. 
１２ Eley (1990) developed this concept by combining the perspective of E. P. 
Thompson (1968) with Habermas’ theory of “public sphere” (Habermas, 1991). 
For reasons why Japanese workers could not fully develop their own working 
class public sphere, see Kumazawa (1996), especially chapter 2, and Shibata 
(2007), chapter 2. 
１３ So far as the state needed positive willful cooperation from workers during 
the modern “total war” situation, the state had to make some sort of concession 
to the working class. This concession generally entailed an elevation of the 
status of industrial workers as “the same national members” and raising their 
working condition through wage controls (Saguchi, 1991). There are, however, 
substantial differences between Japan and countries like Great Britain and the 
U.S. in their wartime mobilization of workers. In the U.S., the government 
intervened into labor relations to mobilize workers through the National War 
Labor Board (NWLB). While the main role of the NWLB was to avoid strikes, it 
facilitated collective bargaining between organized labor and managers, and 
considerably expanded workers’ rights. In Japan, industrial democracy was 
repressed until the end of the Second World War. Therefore, in the U.S., the 
“working class” functioned at an intermediate level of institution and identity, 
and the principle of “equal national membership” largely meant equality 
between the two collective categories of “managers” and “workers.” In Japan, 
individual workers had to rely directly on the “egalitarian” drive of nationalist 
ideology and the states’ policy without a reliable intermediate institution and 
identity (ibid.).  
１４  Gordon (1998: 196-7) indicates that the ultra-cooperative stance of 
mainstream unions and corporate hegemony since the 1960s has been stronger 
in Japan than anywhere else in the world. 
１５ Gordon (1998) shows that the tactics of informal group had enormous 
influences on Japanese labor relations, and he characterizes them as 
“Leninism-through-the-looking-glass”: “Informal groups acted as a vanguard 
intent on leading the masses in the politically correct opposite direction” (135). 
See also Saito (1990: 62, 294) for a discussion of this issue.  
１６  There are some wage gaps between white- and blue-collar employees 
among the male regular employees. However, the male regular employees are 
stratified not only by the type of job but also by company size and educational 
background. The economic conditions of male employees divided by the type 
of job (white- or blue-collar), educational background, and company size can be 
estimated by each group’s average monthly income. Given the nature of 
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seniority-based wage system that makes wage disparity among young 
employees small and that among middle aged employees large, however, the 
average income of age 50-to-54 group would be a better indicator for the actual 
economic condition of each employee group. Using the data of this age group, 
the male high-school-graduate blue-collar workers employed in large 
corporations earn 70.6% of the monthly salary of their collage-graduate 
white-collar counterparts and 86.3% of the male high-school-graduate 
white-collar workers in large corporations. But these male high-school-graduate 
blue-collar workers employed in large corporations earn more than male 
high-school graduate white-collar workers in medium size corporations and 
male collage graduate white-collar workers in small corporations in 2001. The 
data source is the Table E-17 in Statistics and Information Department (2003: 
154-157). Here, at least the distinction between white- and blue-collar jobs 
among regular employees is not the major reason for wage disparities.  
１７ Therefore, “comparable worth” (“pay equity”) policies alone would not 
eliminate gender discrimination in Japan since female employees tend to be 
placed in dead-end low paid jobs even if “comparable worth” policies are 
implemented. What is necessary to improve the situation is to make the 
evaluation that determines placement of employees into jobs and positions 
within the internal labor market gender-neutral, or to establish fair and 
gender-neutral work rules for job placements (Kumazawa, 2000; Ogoshi, 2006). 
１８ The welfare system based on the assumption of gender division of labor at 
home was a deliberate strategy by the government. The Liberal Democratic 
Party’s 1979 policy paper, Nihon-gata Fukushi Shakai (Japanese-style Welfare 
Society) clearly adopts this strategy. The document set up a hypothetical 
Japanese citizen as a “typical” welfare recipient and examined how his welfare 
ought to be changed and should be met throughout his life. Not surprisingly, 
this “typical” individual is a male salaryman and according to the document, he 
could not take any family-related responsibility after the age of thirty since he 
would be a position with heavy responsibilities in his company. The document 
states that his family is the prime welfare provider. In other words, his wife is 
not regarded as a welfare recipient but only as a welfare provider (Nomura, 
1998; Osawa, 1993). The document makes no secret of supporting the complete 
gender division of labor at home. This welfare policy took effect since the 1980s. 
Influenced by this idea, the employment safety-net system for non-regular 
employees remains underdeveloped. 
１９ The data source is Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare of Japan (2009), 
“Heisei 20nendo Chingin Kōzō Kihon Tōkei Chōsa.” For income levels of 
regular and fulltime non-regular employees, the Ministry’s research results only 
show average regular monthly salaries, excluding bonus and other allowances 
given only to regular employees and some full-time non-regular employees. In 
order to obtain more accurate wage gap data, their hourly wages shown in 
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Table 1 are calculated by adding “yearly bonus and other special allowances” 
(converted to hourly wage) to their monthly regular salary data (converted to 
hourly wages). I have learned this correction method from Morioka (2009a: 155). 
It should be also indicated that many statistical dataset for international 
comparisons of hourly wage, including the OECD studies, do not consider this 
problem of the Japanese data.  
２０  A combination of the low wage, long out-of-work period due to job 
insecurity and the ineffective safety-net system results in very low income for 
the non-regular employees. The average annual income of young non-regular 
workers (15 to 34 years old) is about 1.4 million yen (i.e., US$16,700 or 
HK$129,600). This income level makes individual economic independence very 
difficult (Tachibanaki, 2006: 77-78). The overall result of the growth of 
non-regular workers is reflected in a number of indicators. The relative poverty 
rate of Japan in 2007 is 15.7%, the fourth from the worst among the 30 OECD 
member states, and this rate is estimated to be worsened (Mainichi Newspaper, 
2009). Gini coefficient (a statistical measure that indicates the degree of 
inequality in terms of household income) marked the highest level in terms of 
income before redistribution in 2008 (the Ministry of Health, 2010a). 
２１ The data source is Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications of 
Japan, “Rōdōryoku Chōsa.” Retrieved on November 1, 2010 from 
http://www.stat.go.jp/data/roudou/longtime/03roudou.htm#hyo_9  
２２ Shortly after the worldwide financial crisis in 2008, a large number of 
non-regular workers were dismissed. As a result, the number of non-regular 
workers declined by about 390,000 while the number of regular workers 
declined only by 190,000. Thus, many non-regular workers are certainly used as 
a buffer in times of economic crisis (Asahi Newspaper, 2010). But the 
non-regular positions lost in the financial crisis only amount to 2.2% of the total 
non-regular workforce. This means that the non-regular employees have grown 
far beyond the level of buffer. 
２３  According to the Japan Institute for Labor Policy and Training (2006), 
among those interviewed enterprises where the number of non-regular 
employees is increasing, 78.3% of them have indicated that hiring non-regular 
workers saved labor costs.  
２４ This system was conceptualized by the Nikkeiren, a powerful association of 
managers in Japan, as a part of Nōryoku shugi (the ability-based principle) at the 
end of the 1960s (Nikkeiren, 1969). 
２５ Endo (1999), based on a comparative study of the U.S. and Japan, suggests 
that Japanese corporations tend to use more ambiguous and subjective 
evaluative criteria than American corporations; more rank and file workers are 
evaluated in Japan than in the U.S.; institutional and legal framework that 
supports employees to express dissatisfaction with evaluation result is much 
weaker in Japan than in the U.S. 
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２６ The following analyses of governmental technologies are drawn on the 
findings and insights in chapter 4 of my Ph.D. dissertation (Shibata 2007). 
２７ Some of the most famous works in this genre are Nakane (1967), Doi (1971), 
Kimura (1972), Vogel (1979), Murakami, Kumon and Sato (1979). For a 
comprehensive survey of works in this genre, see Aoki (1990). Since the 1980s, 
numerous critiques on this discourse appeared both in Japan and elsewhere. 
For critical examinations of this discourse, see Harootunian (1988, 1998), Sakai 
(1988, 1996), Befu (1993), Sugimoto and Mouer (1995). Aoki (1990), having 
examined numerous nihonjinron works, has found that “collectivism” is indeed 
one of the most frequently mentioned “cultural traits of Japanese.” Studies of 
“Japanese management system” (a genre called nihonteki-keieiron) reveal the 
same tendencies (Iida, 1998). 
２８ “Identity” is often understood as a non-instrumental and cultural mode of 
self-understanding as opposed to “interest.” As Brubaker and Cooper (2000) 
indicate, however, this conceptual opposition is untenable (6-7). Claims for a 
particular identity and membership are very often linked to social actors’ 
strategic interests. Similarly, exercise of power sometimes takes a form of 
imposing a particular identity on someone else (Foucault 1975, 1982). 
２９ The translation of the term kyōsei sareta jihatsusei into “coerced volunteerism” 
is found in Weathers and North (2009: 624); the use of “forced spontaneity” is 
mine. 
３０ Foucault modified his earlier studies of “disciplinary power” (Foucault, 
1995) and “biopower” (Foucault, 1990) into the concept of “governmentality” in 
his series of lecture given at the Collége de France (Foucault 2003, 2007, 2008). 
See also Foucault (1979, 1982) and Burchell, Gordon and Miller (1991).  
３１ One of the most famous of company mottos is “Seven Spirits of Matsushita 
Electric that Should Be Respected.” In each workplace at the Matsushita Electric 
(Panasonic at present), all employees chant the “Seven Spirits” and then sing a 
company song in unison every morning (Saito, 1990; Sataka, 1996). I have no 
knowledge, however, if this practice is still continued today. 
３２ Aoki (1990) estimates more than two thousand books and articles in this 
genre to have been published from 1946 to 1988. Befu (1993) indicates that a 
large number of works in this genre have been reprinted as many as one 
hundred times. 
３３ Spreading the nationalist discourse in corporations and characterizing a 
corporation as Gemeinschaft and “a community of destiny” have been a quite 
explicit labor management strategies since the 1960s (Kitagawa, 1968: 73, 
124-128, 184-186, and 214-220). The difference is that while the explicitly 
nationalist ideas such as “respecting the Emperor” were invoked by business 
leaders in the 1960s (ibid.), the nationalist discourse became “softer” under the 
guise of social scientific studies on “culture” during the 1970s and 1980s. 
３４  Similarly, Befu (1993) states that nihonjinron, a descriptive discourse, 
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actually works as prescriptive (normative) model. It is a “modern moral 
textbook” (116-117). 
３５ One of the clearest examples of this claim in karoshi lawsuits is the case of 
Mr. Uchino of Toyota who died from overwork. See Kumazawa (2010: 323-333) 
and Weathers and North (2009) for detailed discussions of this case. The 
strategic blurring between working hours and off-work hours is often part of 
the JIT production system in Japan as highlighted in Uchino’s case (Kumazawa, 
2010). 
３６ Concerning the peer competition in the internal labor market, Burawoy 
(1979) adds an important modification to Doeringer and Piore’s theory of 
internal labor market: “Competition is by no means eliminated by the internal 
labor market, as Doeringer and Piore imply, but rather takes on a new form, 
regulated by different sets of constraints and rules” (96). Burawoy, however, 
saw the Japanese corporation as an exception to this trend (ibid: 232, n.6). This 
is probably because he observed the tendencies of Japanese corporations only 
up to the 1970s. His view on the competition within the internal labor market is 
especially applicable to the Japanese corporation since the 1970s. 
３７  Bourdieu always talks about “field” only in relation to “habitus” and 
“capital,” and it is hard to find a precise and concise definition of “field” in his 
writings. For relatively clear discussions of “field,” see Bourdieu (1990: 66-68) 
and Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992: 94-139). Calhoun, Lipuma, and Postone 
(1993) define “field” as a semi-autonomous space “characterized by its own 
determinate agents (for example, students, novelists, scientists), its own 
accumulation of history, its own logic of action, and its own forms of capital” 
(5). 
３８ This state is what Goffman calls “role distance” (Goffman, [1961] 1990). 
Berger (1963) summarizes it as “the playing of a role tongue-in-cheek, without 
really meaning it and with an ulterior purpose” (135). He further indicates that: 
“Goffman’s concept could be applied more widely to all cases where a role is 
played deliberately without inner identification, in other words, where the actor 
has established an inner distance between his consciousness and his 
role-playing” (ibid.). 
３９ Sugimoto (1997) states: “Thus an employee who expresses dedication to his 
company boss in accordance with the corporate tatemae of loyalty and harmony 
may do so because of his honne ambition for promotion and other personal 
gains” (26). Tatemae can be understood as what Wright Mills ([1940] 1990) called 
the “vocabulary of motive,” a socially legitimated set of “motives” strategically 
used by situated actors to appeal to others. The specificity in Japanese 
corporation is that the socially legitimated vocabulary of motive that situated 
actors can use is limited to the “collectivist” one. This situation has, however, 
been changing since the mid-1990s. 
４０ The positive social image of salaryman stratum and the negative image of 
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blue-collar workers were mutually constitutive in prewar Japan. The sharp 
contrast between the two strata resulted from the state’s cultural Westernization 
policy and from the spread of the discourse of “civilization and enlightenment” 
from the Meiji (1868-1912) to the Taisho (1912-1926) eras as part of Japan’s 
modernization project. The image of modernized family lifestyle catered for 
salaryman families was disseminated also by the promoters of modern 
consumption culture such as department stores. For an in-detailed discussion, 
see Koyama (1999), chapter 2 of Shibata (2007), Takeuchi (1996, 1997) and 
Terade (1994). 
４１ For critical discussions of the dissemination of these idealized images of 
family lifestyle through mass media and the incitement of status competition in 
postwar Japan, see Ivy (1993), Iwamoto (2002), Kubo (1991), Miura (1999), 
Nishiyama (1991), Sakata (1990), Sato (1990), chapter 5 of Shibata (2007), Yasuda 
(1995) and Yoshimi (1997). 
４２ For details about the corporations’ reinforcement of the gender division of 
labor in the families of their male employees in postwar Japan, see Gordon 
(1998: 74-79), Kimoto (1995a), Kinoshita (1988), Nomura (1998), chapter 6 of 
Shibata (2007), and Yamashiro (1973). 
４３ For analyses of how the “middle status” consumption norm is driving the 
majority of workers to overwork, see chapter 9 of Kumazawa (1996) and 
chapter 5 of Shibata (2007). For an understanding of how male regular 
employees’ masculine sense of “family responsibility” is limited to fulfilling the 
role of the breadwinner of the family, see Amano (2001). 
４４ The overall view on these two motivational sources that lead employees to 
adapt to the competitive game in Japan is drawn from Kumazawa (2010). The 
term “strategic subordination” is taken from Deetz (1998), who analyzed a 
corporation in the U.S. where employees believed themselves to be constantly 
evaluated: 
Through self-surveillance and control of their bodies, feelings, dress, 
and behavior, they use themselves for their own strategized 
employment and career movement. … Strategized subordination 
happens as members actively subordinate themselves to obtain 
money, security, meaning, or identity. (164). 
４５ This form of power had been an integral part of the state’s modernization 
strategy since the beginning of the Meiji government in 1868. It is what Foucault 
(1990, 2003) calls “biopower,” which tries both to increase the physical and 
mental capacity of the population and to subjugate them at the same time, 
seeing the population as the vital resource to utilize for economic and military 
development. For details, see Fujino (2000) and chapter 2 of Shibata (2007). 
４６ At the same time, the discourse of cultural nationalism changed to that of 
political nationalism. Changes in the hegemonic discourse of management had 
to do with the way in which employees and the population were governed in 
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modern Japanese history. For details, see Shibata (2007). 
４７ The existence of this form of power should be taken into account in the 
debate between liberalists such as John Rawls (1991) and “communitarians” 
such as Michel Sandel (1982, 1996). In my view, the communitarian theory does 
have a potential to go beyond the liberal theory because of its Tocquevillian 
emphasis on the importance of collective self-government (i.e., “collectivism 
from below”) for democracy. At the same time, communitarians tend to 
downplay the danger of the technology of power that utilizes communitarian 
vocabulary (i.e., “collectivism from above”), which hinder the democratic 
process of collective self-government. Liberal thinkers may be aware of the 
danger of this form of power; yet they tend to minimize the importance of 
“collectivism from below” and discard it together with “collectivism from 
above.” In other words, neither theoretical position distinguishes the two types 
of collectivism. 
４８ The photo was downloaded from the Rōdō Sōdan Sentā, Sutaffu Nikki 
(2008). Retrieved on April 5, 2011 from http://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/ 
k10015966401000.html 
４９ Many social scientists who apply Foucauldian or similar perspectives to the 
analysis of the current labor management in the U.S. and Great Britain often 
directly or indirectly suggest the influences of Japan’s labor management 
technologies through the import of the JIT production system and human 
resource management. For details, see Barker (1993), Casey (1995), Delbridge, 
Turnbull and Wilkinson (1992), Fucini and Fucini (1990), Knights (2002), 
Knights and Willmott (2002), McKinlay and Taylor (1998), and Sewell (1998, 
1999). 
５０ The photo was taken by Yuriko Nakao of Reuters Japan (2011). Retrieved on 
April 13, 2011 from http://jp.reuters.com/article/topNews/idJPJAPAN- 
20291920110328 
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University and Research Associate, Fairbank Center, Harvard University 
 
“Like every major society in the post-Cold War era, China struggles to find national unity in the 
midst of ethnic, religious, and regional diversity. This timely new book gives us a fresh look at 
these struggles, and new consideration of the political, social, and moral challenges they pose. It 
is especially valuable for providing a historical context for present-day challenges.”--Richard 
Madsen, Distinguished Professor of Sociology and China Studies, University of California, San 
Diego 
 
“Marginalization in China prompts readers to rethink many central issues: how minority groups 
refashion state-imposed labels; how nation building is shaped by the contention between state 
structures and indigenous agencies; and how identity formation and interest representation are 
negotiated along conflicting class, gender, religious, and ethnic lines. This is a rich and thought-
provoking book that should be read closely and one that deserves a wide audience.”--Tak-Wing 
Ngo, Leiden University, The Netherlands 
 
“What makes this volume innovative is its rather broad conceptualization of ‘minority.’ This is 
one of the first English language volumes to provide a wider analytical gaze at the politics of 
social marginalization, making an important contribution to the academic discourse on 
multiculturalism.”--James Leibold, Politics and Asian Studies, La Trobe University, Australia 
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“This paper, with its rich empirical data, robust methodology, and strong 
theorization, should be recommended to all researchers on transnationalism 
and contemporary migration.” – Prof. Manying Ip, University of Auckland, 
New Zealand, Asia Pacific World 
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“This is a modest, informative work that sheds light on the early history of 
missionary schools that created the foundation for the modern school 
system in China.” – Dr. Rie Kido Askew, Monash University, Australia, Asia 
Pacific World  
 
 
